Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 0905454

 

This is a PROVISIONAL PARTIAL REFUSAL of the trademark in the above-referenced U.S. application that applies to only the following goods in the application:  cots; high chairs for babies; infant walkers; bassinettes; cradles; cushions; pillows; sleeping bag; bolsters.  See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c).

 

WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL PARTIAL REFUSAL:

 

Applicant may respond directly to this provisional refusal Office action if applicant is not represented by an authorized attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii).  Otherwise, applicant’s authorized attorney must respond on applicant’s behalf.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(i).  However, the only attorneys who are authorized to sign responses and practice before the USPTO in trademark matters are as follows:

 

(1)  Attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions of the United States; and

 

(2)  Canadian agents/attorneys who represent applicants located in Canada and (a) are registered with the USPTO and in good standing as patent agents or (b) have been granted reciprocal recognition by the USPTO.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.5(b)(2), 11.14(a), (c); TMEP §§602, 712.03.

 

Foreign attorneys, other than authorized Canadian attorneys, are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c), (e); TMEP §602.03-.03(b).  That is, foreign attorneys may not file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal, among other things.  See 37 C.F.R. §11.5(b)(2); TMEP §§602.03(c), 608.01.  If applicant is represented by such a foreign attorney, applicant must respond directly to this provisional refusal Office action.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii).

 

THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY PARTIALLY REFUSED AS FOLLOWS:

 

This is a partial refusal Office action; the refusal applies only to specified goods in the U.S. application.

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Please note the partial abandonment advisory below.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES THAT APPLICANT MUST ADDRESS

 

• Refusal under Section 2(d) with respect to Reg. No. 1910758 (limited to specific goods)

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

This refusal is limited to the following goods:  cots; high chairs for babies; infant walkers; bassinettes; cradles; cushions; pillows; sleeping bag; bolsters.

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1910758.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Applicant’s mark is BABYFIRST.

 

Registrant’s mark is BABY’S FIRST.  The respective marks are highly similar with applicant’s mark merely deleting the possessive form of BABY (by deleting the apostrophe and the “S”) and deleting the space between the terms BABY and FIRST.  The initial terms are virtually identical and the second terms are identical.

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Mattel Inc. v. Funline Merch. Co., 81 USPQ2d 1372, 1374-75 (TTAB 2006); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

Applicant’s relevant goods are “Cots; high chairs for babies; infant walkers; bassinettes; cradles; cushions; pillows; sleeping bag; bolsters.”

 

Registrant’s goods are “juvenile furniture, namely highchairs.”  Accordingly, the parties’ respective goods are identical in part (i.e., high chairs) and otherwise closely related baby furniture and cushions and sleeping bags.  In support of the relatedness of registrant’s high chairs and the remaining goods identified in the instant application and subject to this refusal, attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely, e.g., high chairs, cushions, and/or sleeping bags, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Dallas,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

In further support of the relatedness of these goods, please see the attached market evidence showing the respective goods offered under a common mark and/or through identical channels of trade.

 

If the goods and/or services of the respective parties are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would be required with diverse goods and/or services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

However, the goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, it is sufficient that the goods and/or services are related in some manner and/or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

In view of the above, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

PARTIAL ABANDONMENT – ADVISORY

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within the six-month period for response, the following goods in International Class 20 will be deleted from the application:  Cots; high chairs for babies; infant walkers; bassinettes; cradles; cushions; pillows; sleeping bag; bolsters.  The application will then proceed with the following goods in International Class 20 only:  identification bracelets not of metal, for hospitals.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); TMEP §718.02(a).

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

There is no required format or form for responding to an Office action; however, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If a refusal has issued, applicant may wish to argue against the refusal, i.e., submit arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  To respond to requirements, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements and request that the Office enter them into the application record. 

 

The response must be signed by the individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §§611.03(b), 611.06 et seq., 712.01.  In the case of joint applicants, all must sign.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §611.06(a).  In addition, the proper signatory must personally sign or personally enter his/her electronic signature.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a), (e)(2)(ii); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02.

 

The Office recommends applicants use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to respond to Office actions online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If applicant responds on paper via regular mail, the response should include the title “Response to Office Action” and the following information:  (1) the name and law office number of the examining attorney, (2) the serial number and filing date of the application, (3) the date of issuance of this Office action, (4) applicant’s name, address, telephone number and e-mail address (if applicable), and (5) the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.194(b)(1); TMEP §302.03(a).

 

Questions regarding this Office action may be directed to the undersigned examining attorney.

 

 

/Karen P. Severson/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 117

Telephone:  571-272-8285

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form at http://teasroa.gov.uspto.report/roa/.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.