Offc Action Outgoing

This letter responds to the applicant's communication filed on January 4, 2008. The refusal under Section 2(e)(1) is reconsidered and withdrawn as a potential barrier to registration.

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 1527965 as to be likely, when used on the identified goods/services, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

The examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive. For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

Likelihood of Confusion

The test under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is whether there is a likelihood of confusion. It is unnecessary to show actual confusion in establishing likelihood of confusion. See Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and cases cited therein.

In the instant case, the applicant applied to register the mark CONDUCTOR. The registrant’s mark is CONDUCTORS UNLIMITED. The examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).

When the applicant's mark is compared to a registered mark, "the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference." Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956). These marks are quite similar because they share the term CONDUCTOR and they create confusingly similar commercial impressions. Essentially, both marks suggest that the wire connector goods can conduct electricity or current.

The applicant argues that the addition of the design element obviates the Section 2(d) refusal. Although the registrant’s mark contains a design element, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods or services. In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc., 192 USPQ 729 (TTAB 1976). TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). The literal portions are the dominant and most significant features of marks because consumers will call for the goods or services in the marketplace by that portion. In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); In re Drug Research Reports, Inc., 200 USPQ 554 (TTAB 1978). For this reason, the examining attorney must give greater weight to the literal portions of the marks in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

It is well established that while the examining attorney must look at the marks in their entireties under Section 2(d), nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression. Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. In re National Data Corp., 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. V. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (CCPA 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1988). In the present case, both of the marks are dominated by term “CONDUCTOR.” The term has not been disclaimed as being descriptive by either the applicant or the registrant in this case and there is no evidence that the term “CONDUCTOR” is commonly used in the field. Thus, the term CONDUCTOR must be considered as suggestive for the goods and therefore entitled to a wide scope of protection.

The applicant also argues that the marks are not confusingly similar because the applicant’s mark does not include the additional term UNLIMITED. The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (where applicant filed to register the mark OPTIQUE for optical wear, deletion of the term BOUTIQUE is insufficient to distinguish the mark, per se, from the registered mark OPTIQUE BOUTIQUE when used in connection with competing optical wear). In the present case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); ECI Division of E-Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980); TMEP §1207.01(b).

The goods/services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods/services come from a common source. In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978). The goods of the applicant, namely, “Electrical wiring connectors,” and the goods of the registrant, namely, “electrical wire, cable and power cords, and connectors therefor,” are highly related because both are electrical wire connectors. The applicant does not dispute that the goods are highly related.

In view of all of the foregoing, the refusal pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d) is repeated and made FINAL

Appropriate Response to a Final Action

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond to this final action by:

(1) submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

(2) filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2). 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters. The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

/Curtis W. French/

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 115

United States Trademark Office

571-272-9472

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office action should be filed using the form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.