Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  78/883696

 

Refusal:  Likelihood of Confusion Refusal Under Section 2(d)

 

The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the applicant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods/services, so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2833673 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.  TMEP §§1207.01 et. seq.   See the enclosed registration.

 

The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Second, the examining attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).  TMEP §§1207.01 et. seq.

 

Applicant seeks to register the mark TWEAK (standard character format) for “full line of clothing, headwear, sleepwear and footwear”; the already-registered mark is TWEAK (typed) for “Clothing, namely, boots, shoes, shirts, pants, sweaters, jackets, socks, shorts, sweatpants, sweatshirts, head wear, head bands, gloves, and scarves; ski boots and snowboard boots, and parts thereof, namely buckles for boots sold as a component of boots and tongues.”

 

When applicant’s mark is compared to a registered mark, “the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference.”  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 40, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (internal citation omitted).  Moreover, regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Furthermore, a mark in typed or standard character form means that the mark may be displayed in any lettering style.  37 C.F.R. §2.52(a).  The rights associated with a mark in typed or standard character form reside in the wording itself, and registrant or applicant is free to adopt any style of lettering, including lettering identical to that used by the other.  Therefore, where one mark at issue is in special form and the other in standard character form or typed, a likelihood of confusion will not be avoided because the standard character or typed mark could be used in the same manner of display as the stylized mark.  See In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1387-88 (TTAB 1991); In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2015 (TTAB 1988); Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Sunex Int’l Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (TTAB 1987); In re Hester Indus., Inc., 231 USPQ 881, 882, n.6 (TTAB 1986); United Rum Merchants, Ltd. v. Fregal, Inc., 216 USPQ 217, 220 (TTAB 1982); Frances Denney, Inc. v. Vive Parfums, Ltd., 190 USPQ 302, 303-04 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).

 

Here, applicant’s mark is in standard character format while registrant’s is typed.  Both are TWEAK.  Thus, there can be no doubt that the marks are confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression.

 

The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.  In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).

 

Moreover, likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods and/or services identified in the application and registration.  If the application describes the goods and/or services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  See In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (“With reference to the channels of trade, applicant’s argument that its goods are sold only in its own retail stores is not persuasive …There is no restriction [in its identification of goods] as to the channels of trade in which the goods are sold”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Here, applicant’s goods are identical to – or at the very least, encompass – the goods of registrant.  There can be no doubt that such goods will be marketed through the same channels of trade and encountered by the same class of purchasers who will mistakenly believe that they come from a single source.

 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Potential Refusal:  Prior Pending Application

 

Additionally, applicant should note that the examining attorney encloses information regarding pending Application Serial No. 78/813718.  The filing dates of the referenced application precedes applicant's filing date.  There may be a likelihood of confusion between applicant's mark and the referenced mark under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d).  If the referenced application matures into a registration, the examining attorney may refuse registration in this case under Section 2(d).  37 C.F.R. Section 2.83; TMEP section 1208.01.

 

Advisory:  Identification of Goods Versus Specimen of Use Submitted with Allegation of Use

 

Applicant should note that, upon filing of an amendment to allege use or statement of use, applicant will be required to provide evidence to substantiate use for a full line of products as identified in the identification of goods.  If the applicant cannot do so, applicant will be required to amend the identification of goods to conform to the usual standards for specificity.  TMEP §1402.03(c).

 

Responding to This Office Action

 

No set form is required for response to this Office action.  Applicant must respond to each point raised.  Applicant should simply set forth the required changes or statements and request that the Office enter them.

 

If applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

 

/Susan Kastriner Lawrence/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116

(571) 272-9186

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.