UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  78/534351

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application filed on December 17, 2004, and has determined the following:

 

Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1,611,040.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

 

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).  If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the present case, the applicant seeks to register the mark WORKFORCE, in standard character form, for, among other things, “bricks, stones, plywood, lumber, boards, studs,” “ceiling materials,” and “gutters.”  The registrant own the mark WORKFORCE for “elevating platforms for personnel and material.”

 

The applicant’s mark is identical to the registration and, consequently, the marks have identical sounds, appearances, and commercial impressions.

 

Additionally, if the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

The applicant intends to sell highly goods that are highly related to those of the registrants, if not identical.  Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods and/or services identified in the application and registration.  If the application describes the goods and/or services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  See In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (“With reference to the channels of trade, applicant’s argument that its goods are sold only in its own retail stores is not persuasive …There is no restriction [in its identification of goods] as to the channels of trade in which the goods are sold”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

The applicant’s use of broad terms will most certainly include the goods classified in both of the registrations.  Moreover, neither the application nor the registration(s) contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., hardware stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. V. KangaROOS U.S.A. Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994).

 

Thus, taken as a whole, the overall similarities among the marks and the goods are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion among potential consumers.  Moreover, the examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).  Hence, the examining attorney must refuse registration of the mark.

 

Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  If applicant chooses to respond to the refusal(s) to register, then applicant must also respond to the following requirement(s).

 

Identification of Goods

The wording in the identification of goods needs clarification because it is too broad and includes goods classified in other international classes.  TMEP §§1402.01 and 1402.03.  Applicant may substitute any of the following wordings, if accurate:

 

Melamine, in International Class 1; and/or

 

Bricks; stones; plywood, lumber, wood boards, and wood building studs; decking material, namely, [specify using common commercial names]; gypsum, spackling compound; decorative wood mouldings; millwork exclusive of cabinets, non-metal window screens and window glass; wood paneling, concrete; mortars; cement mixes; ceiling materials, namely, [specify using common commercial name, e.g., boards, panels]; non-metal gutters, non-metal storage sheds, non-metal windows and doors; non-metal garage doors; grout, tile materials, namely, [specify using common commercial names], in International Class 19; and/or

 

Plastic storage containers, in International Class 20.

 

TMEP §§1402.01 and 1402.03.

 

 

For assistance with identifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the online searchable Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.

 

It is acknowledged that the applicant has co-pending applications, Serial Nos. 78/534272 and 78/534357, for Classes 1 and 20 goods, respectively, and the aforementioned referenced goods in each respective class may be added to the appropriate application.  However, please note that, while the identification of goods may be amended to clarify or limit the goods, adding to the goods or broadening the scope of the goods is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include goods that are not within the scope of the goods set forth in the present identification.

 

 

/Winston Folmar/

Staff Attorney

Law Office 101

(571) 272-9716 (Tel.)

winston.folmar@uspto.gov

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form (visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions, but if the Office Action has been issued via email, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office Action to respond via TEAS).
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above and include the serial number, law office number and examining attorney’s name in your response.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.