Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  78/453193

 

This Office Action is in response to applicant’s correspondence dated 8/26/05.

 

The following refusal is now made FINAL: Section 2(d) refusal.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

 

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

The refusal to register the proposed mark is continued because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1766762.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

 

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant’s mark, SLIDER, is identical in sound and appearance to registrant’s mark, SLIDER.  Applicant’s examples of a few possible meanings for the word “slider,” including registrant’s mascot, make it less difficult to imagine that some consumers could perceive the word “slider” differently.  But this Office must look at the registration on its face, and the registrant has not limited the significance of its mark to an image of a mascot.  Similarity in only of the above may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  Here, because the sound and appearance of the marks is exactly the same, it is very likely that consumers would be confused as to the source of the goods.

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Applicant should note that if the marks of the respective parties are identical, as is the case here, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Applicant’s goods are footwear.  Registrant’s goods are clothing, namely shirts.  The goods are related because both footwear and shirts are clothing items.  As indicated in the prior Office Action, the decisions in the clothing field have held many different types of apparel to be related under Section 2(d).  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 286 F.2d 623, 128 USPQ 549 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“WINTER CARNIVAL” for women’s boots v. men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233 (TTAB 1992) (“ELANCE” for underwear v. “ELAAN” for neckties); In re Melville Corp. 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991) (“ESSENTIALS” for women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets v. women’s shoes); In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (“NEWPORTS” for women’s shoes v. “NEWPORT” for outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397 (TTAB 1982) (“OMEGA” for hosiery v. trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444 (TTAB 1975) (“GRANADA” for men’s suits, coats, and trousers v. ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400 (TTAB 1964) (“SLEEX” for brassieres and girdles v. slacks for men and young men). 

 

Applicant has made arguments regarding the differences in the marketing of the goods. However, neither the application nor the registration contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. V. KangaROOS U.S.A. Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994).

 

Several companies have registered trademarks for both t-shirts and footwear.  Many of these companies include sports teams such as the registrant.  Attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These attached copies include sporting team mascot registrations.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely footwear and shirts, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).  Thus, consumers could believe that the applicant’s footwear goods were connected to the registrant’s shirt goods.  

 

Applicant’s arguments regarding cancelled Registration No. 1331011 are unpersuasive.  The wording SLIDERS could be seen as descriptive or even generic for the bowling shoes goods.  The Office is constrained by what appears on the face of the current registration.

 

Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

For all the reasons stated above, registration is refused based on Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

 

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matter.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

/Tejbir Singh/

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 106

(571) 272-5878

(571) 273-9106 (fax)

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form (visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions, but if the Office Action has been issued via email, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office Action to respond via TEAS).
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above and include the serial number, law office number and examining attorney’s name in your response.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.