UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 2/22/2010

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62, 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Refusal-Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3526279.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the services, and similarity of trade channels of the services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Applicant’s mark, BUZZER, is highly similar to the registered mark VBUZZER in sound, appearance and commercial impression.  The only difference between the marks is the letter “V” in the registered mark.   However, this minor difference does not alter the commercial impressions of the marks sufficiently to obviate the likelihood of confusion. As noted by the attached Internet printout, the letter “V” is commonly used as an acronym to reference the words “video” and “voice”, which are generic terms as applied to the services associated with the registered mark. See the attached Internet printout.

 

With regard to the common term “BUZZER” in the marks, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). As such, the respective marks create similar overall commercial impressions.

 

Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469, 471 (TTAB 1975); see TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

In addition, with regard to the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the services they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).  In this case, consumers will undoubtedly retain a similar general recollection of the marks; namely, BUZZER and VBUZZER telecommunications services.

 

Finally, with regard to the marks, if the services of the respective parties are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would be required with diverse services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Turning to the services of the parties, they need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, the services need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

Applicant’s “transmission of electronic and instant messages to and from mobile devices” are closely related to the registrant’s “mobile telephony” and related services because they are commontelecommunication services likely to travel through the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  For example, the services are likely to be advertised in telecommunications and mobile communications directories and trade publications.

 

Furthermore, neither the application nor the registration contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the services and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s services are marketed everywhere that is normal for such services, i.e., telecommunications and mobile communications directories and trade publications.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these services and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them promoted under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

In support of the relatedness of the goods and services at issue, the examining attorney attaches copies of sample printouts from the USPTO X-Search database showing third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the services of the parties are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Thus, it is likely that consumers accustomed to seeing the applicant’s and registrant’s services sold under same or similar marks would be confused.

 

Any services in the registrant’s normal fields of expansion must also be considered in order to determine whether the registrant’s services are related to the applicant’s identified services for purposes of analysis under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).  The test is whether purchasers would believe the service is within the registrant’s logical zone of expansion.  CPG Prods. Corp. v. Perceptual Play, Inc., 221 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(a)(v).  Inasmuch as the examiner has already established the relationship between the services, purchasers are likely to believe that applicant’s message transmission services are within the registrant’s logical zone of expansion.

 

In this regard, the fact that the services of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular services, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Finally, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Based on the foregoing remarks, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

Applicant should also note the following refusal and potential refusal.

Prior Pending Application

The filing date of pending Application Serial No. 77766254 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application.  If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

Refusal-Merely Descriptive

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature, characteristic, purpose and function of applicant’s services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the specified services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217-18, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  Moreover, a mark that identifies a group of users to whom an applicant directs its services is also merely descriptive.  TMEP §1209.03(i); see In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1454 (TTAB 2004).

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified services, not in the abstract.  In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system).  “Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

In this case, the proposed mark, BUZZER, merely describes message transmission services for mobile devices that produce, trigger and/or initiate a buzzing feature in such devices when consumers send/receive messages and/or shake their devices in a chat.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); TMEP §§1209 et seq.  The term “Buzzer” means “electronic buzzing device: an electronic device that makes a humming or buzzing sound when activated” and/or “one that buzzes; specifically: an electric signaling device that makes a buzzing sound” and/or “electromagnetic device with an armature that vibrates rapidly, making a buzzing sound”.  See the attached dictionary definition.  Consumers will immediately recognize and perceive the nature of the services when they encounter the proposed mark in the marketplace with software that causes mobile communication devices to buzz when sending and/or receiving messages.

 

This refusal is supported by the attached sample Internet printouts showing use of the word “buzzer” by third-parties in applicant’s industry with messaging services that produce a buzzing/vibrating alert to consumers when sending and/or receiving messages through mobile communication devices, including when shaking devices to send buzzers.  Material obtained from the Internet is generally accepted as competent evidence in examination and ex parte proceedings.  See In re Rodale Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1696, 1700 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show genericness); In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654, 1662 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show false connection); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik”, 80 USPQ2d 1305, 1308-09 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show geographic significance); Fram Trak Indus. v. WireTracks LLC, 77 USPQ2d 2000, 2006 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show relatedness of goods); In re Consol. Specialty Rest. Inc., 71 USPQ2d 1921, 1927-29 (TTAB 2004) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show that geographic location is well-known for particular goods); In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d 1792, 1793 (TTAB 2004) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show surname significance); In re Fitch IBCA Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1058, 1060 (TTAB 2002) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show descriptiveness); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b). 

 

Furthermore, a word or term that describes the function or purpose of a service may be merely descriptive or generic.  TMEP §1209.03(p); see In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 5 USPQ2d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding SCREENWIPE generic for an anti-static cloth used for cleaning computer and television screens); In re Cent. Sprinkler Co., 49 USPQ2d 1194 (TTAB 1998) (holding ATTIC generic for sprinklers installed primarily in attics); In re Reckitt & Colman, N. Am. Inc., 18 USPQ2d 1389 (TTAB 1991) (holding PERMA PRESS generic for soil and stain removers for use on permanent press products).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals and potential refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

Service Information

To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional information about the services.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004); TMEP §814.  The requested information should include fact sheets, brochures and samples of advertisements or promotional materials for the identified services.  If these materials are unavailable, applicant should submit similar documentation for services of the same type, explaining how its own services will differ.  If the services feature new technology and no information regarding competing services is available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the services.

 

The submitted factual information must make clear what the services are and how they are rendered, their salient features, and their prospective customers and channels of trade.  Conclusory statements regarding the services will not satisfy this requirement for information.

 

Failure to respond to a request for information is an additional ground for refusing registration.  See In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1917, 1919 (TTAB 2008); In re DTI P’ship LLP, 67 USPQ2d 1699, 1701-02 (TTAB 2003).  Merely stating that information about the services is available on applicant’s website is an inappropriate response to a request for additional information and is insufficient to make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, 70 USPQ2d at 1457-58.

Significance of Mark

 

Applicant must specify whether the wording “BUZZER” has any significance in the telecommunication and mobile communication trade or industry or as applied to the services described in the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§808.01(c), 814.

 

Further, applicant must provide additional information about this wording to enable proper examination of the application.  Specifically, applicant must respond to the following question: 

 

1.  Do the identified transmission services incorporate and/or otherwise have any connection to a buzzer?

 

Failure to respond to this request for information can be grounds for refusing registration.  See In re DTI P’ship LLP, 67 USPQ2d 1699, 1701 (TTAB 2003); TMEP §814.

 

Miscellaneous

 

If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.

 

 

 

/David Yontef/

Trademark Attorney Advisor

Law Office 105

(571) 272-8274

 

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail.  For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney.  Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

Your trademark application (Serial No. 77869112) has been reviewed.   The examining attorney assigned by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has written a letter (an “Office action”) on 2/22/2010 to which you must respond (unless the Office letter specifically states that no response is required).  Please follow these steps:

 

1. Read the Office letter by clicking on this link http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow?DDA=Y&serial_number=77869112&doc_type=OOA&mail_date=20100222 OR go to  http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter your serial number to access the Office letter.  If you have difficulty accessing the Office letter, contact TDR@uspto.gov.  

                                         

PLEASE NOTE: The Office letter may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

2. Contact the examining attorney who reviewed your application if you have any questions about the content of the Office letter (contact information appears at the end thereof).

 

3. Respond within 6 months, calculated from 2/22/2010 (or sooner if specified in the Office letter), using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form. If you have difficulty using TEAS, contact TEAS@uspto.gov. 

 

ALERT:

 

Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT (loss) of your application.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.