UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/30/2009

 

 

TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the reduced-fee TEAS Plus application must submit certain documents electronically.  In addition, such applicants must accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process and maintain a valid e-mail address.  37 C.F.R. §§2.23(a), (b); TMEP §§819, 819.02(a), (b).  Failure to do so will incur an additional fee of $50 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(1)(iv); TMEP §819.04.

 

Therefore, applicant must submit the following documents using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html:  (1) responses to Office actions; (2) preliminary amendments; (3) changes of correspondence address; (4) changes of owner’s address; (5) appointments and revocations of power of attorney; (6) appointments and revocations of domestic representative; (7) amendments to allege use; (8) statements of use; (9) requests for extension of time to file a statement of use; and (10) requests to delete a Trademark Act Section 1(b) basis.  If applicant files any of these documents on paper instead of via TEAS, then applicant must also submit the $50 per class fee.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(iv), 2.23(a)(1); TMEP §§819.02(b), 819.04.  Telephone responses that result in the issuance of an examiner’s amendment will not incur this additional fee. 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62, 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

TRADEMARK ACT SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL TO REGISTER

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1874341 and 2955255.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b).  The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark, “PATEL BROS.”, is virtually identical to the registrant’s mark, “PATEL BROTHERS” (Reg. No. 1874341) and is confusingly similar in sound, appearance and meaning to the registrant’s mark, “PATEL BROTHERS CASH & CARRY” (Reg. No. 2955255), and will lead to consumer confusion. 

 

The above marks are virtually identical in sound, connotation and meaning, because they contain the virtually identical wording “PATEL BROS.” and “PATEL BROTHERS”.

 

The mere addition of a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (GASPAR’S ALE and JOSE GASPAR GOLD); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (THE LILLY and LILLI ANN); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (MACHO and MACHO COMBOS); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE and CREST CAREER IMAGES); In re Riddle, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) (ACCUTUNE and RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE); In re Cosvetic Labs., Inc., 202 USPQ 842 (TTAB 1979) (HEAD START and HEAD START COSVETIC); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).

 

Comparison of the Goods and Services

 

When determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods and/or services are considered.  Industrial Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and/or services.  In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In comparing the goods and/or services, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner.  In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755, 757 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

The applicant’s goods are “cigars.”

 

The registrant’s services are “retail and wholesale grocery store services.”

 

Attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely “cigars” and “grocery store services”, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).

 

The applicant’s goods are closely related to the registrant’s services because applicant’s goods are likely to be sold through registrant’s services, and therefore, will travel through the same channels of trade to the same classes of purchasers.  Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Finally, the Examining Attorney is not bound by past decisions of the Trademark Examining Operation.  In re Shapely, Inc., 231 USPQ 72, 75 (TTAB 1986).  The Examining Attorney must resolve any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion in favor of the prior registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark that is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir., 1988).  TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME

 

Registration is refused because the proposed mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); TMEP §§1211 et seq.  The primary significance of the mark to the purchasing public determines whether a term is primarily merely a surname.  In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 184 USPQ 421 (C.C.P.A. 1975).

 

The following five factors are used to determine whether a mark is primarily merely a surname:

 

·the rareness of the surname;

·    whether anyone connected with the applicant has the mark as his or her surname;

·    whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

·    whether the mark has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

·    whether the mark is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

TMEP §1211.02(b).  See In re Benthin Management GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-1334 (TTAB 1995); In re Sava Research Corp., 32 USPQ2d 1380 (TTAB 1994) and cases cited therein.

 

Please see the attached evidence from whitepages.com and 411.com establishing the surname significance of the surname “PATEL”.  This evidence shows the proposed mark appearing over 300 times as a surname in a nationwide telephone directory of names.

Further, the examining attorney submits excerpts from the U.S. Trademark Office Register evidencing the finding of primarily merely surname significance for PATEL in previous registrations, as well as the generic treatment of the term BROTHERS and BROS.  In this case, the terms BROTHERS and BROS. serve only to establish the type of entity of applicant.  The use of this term, in combination with the surname, serves simply to establish that the applicant organization consists of brothers.  In this context, BROS. has the same effect as the terms Inc. or Corp. following a surname.  (Please see attached).

If applicant chooses to respond to the refusals to register, then applicant must also respond to the following requirement.

 

PRIOR REGISTRATIONS

 

If applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration Nos. 3023623 and 3630611, then applicant must submit a claim of ownership.  37 C.F.R. §2.36; TMEP §812.  The following standard format is suggested:

 

Applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration Nos. 3023623 and 3630611.

 

 

If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.

To expedite prosecution of this application, applicant is encouraged to file its response to this Office action through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.

 

 

 

 

/Kelly McCoy/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

Phone - (571) 272-8976

Fax - (571) 273-8976

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail.  For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney.  Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                

IMPORTANT NOTICE

USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 6/30/2009 FOR

APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77713492

 

Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

  

VIEW OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow?DDA=Y&serial_number=77713492&doc_type=OOA&mail_date=20090630 (or copy and paste this URL into the address field of your browser), or visit http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action.

 

PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this notification.

 

RESPONSE MAY BE REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) if a response is required; (2) how to respond; and (3) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 6/30/2009.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System response form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm.

 

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail

TDR@uspto.gov.  Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action. 

 

        WARNING

1. The USPTO will NOT send a separate e-mail with the Office action attached.

 

2. Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.