| To: | A&E Television Networks (trademarks@sonnenschein.com) |
| Subject: | TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77525187 - HISTORY - 216002608-17 |
| Sent: | 4/21/2009 8:44:54 PM |
| Sent As: | ECOM117@USPTO.GOV |
| Attachments: |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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SERIAL NO: 77/525187
MARK: HISTORY
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
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APPLICANT: A&E Television Networks
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/21/2009
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 3/27/09.
It is noted that the applicant has acceptably amended the identifications of goods and services.
Registration was refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1),because the proposed mark merely describes of a feature, characteristic, purpose and/or subject matter of applicant’s goods and services. In addition to being merely descriptive, the applied-for mark appears to be generic in connection with the identified goods/services and, therefore, incapable of functioning as a source-identifier for applicant’s goods/services.
In response, applicant argues:
The Applicant respectfully disagrees with the Examiner and believes that Applicant's mark has acquired distinctiveness by substantial exclusive and continuous use in commerce since at least as early as 1991 and through its 29 registrations (listed in Exhibit A) that do not disclaim HISTORY. Therefore, Applicant requests that the application be amended to include a claim of distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f).
A review of the applicant’s claim of distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) is reviewed as follows:
Claim of Acquired Distinctiveness Denied
Applicant amended the application to assert acquired distinctiveness based on a claim of ownership of prior registrations, as well as based upon more than five years’ use in commerce. However, a review of the applied-for mark and the marks in the list of prior registrations indicates that the applied-for mark is not the same as any of the referenced prior registrations.
A proposed mark is the “same mark as a previously registered mark for the purpose of 37 C.F.R. §2.41(b)” if it is the “legal equivalent” of such a mark. A mark is the legal equivalent of another if it creates the same, continuing commercial impression such that the consumer would consider them both the same mark. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1347, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Leupold & Stevens Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1475, 1477 (TTAB 1988) (“The words GOLDEN RING, while they are used to describe the device, are by no means identical to or substantially identical to the gold ring device trademark.”); In re Best Products Co., Inc., 231 USPQ 988, 989 n.6 (TTAB 1986) (“[W]e infer in the instant case that the differences between the marks BEST & Des. and BEST JEWELRY & Des., and between the identifications of services in their respective registrations, were deemed to be immaterial differences.”); In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 223 USPQ 513, 514 n.5 (TTAB 1984), aff’d, 769 F.2d 764, 226 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We do not, however, agree with the Examining Attorney that a minor difference in the marks (i.e., here, merely that the mark of the existing registration is in plural form) is a proper basis for excluding any consideration of this evidence under the rule.”); In re Flex-O-Glass, Inc., 194 USPQ 203, 205-06 (TTAB 1977) (“[P]ersons exposed to applicant’s registered mark ... would, upon encountering [applicant’s yellow rectangle and red circle design] ..., be likely to accept it as the same mark or as an inconsequential modification or modernization thereof.... [A]pplicant may ‘tack on’ to its use of the mark in question, the use of the registered mark ... and therefore may properly rely upon its registration in support of its claim of distinctiveness herein.”). TMEP Section 1212.04(b).
The existence of other applications to register the same mark, or other known uses of the mark, does not automatically eliminate the possibility of using this method of proof, but the examining attorney should inquire as to the nature of such use and be satisfied that it is not substantial or does not nullify the claim of distinctiveness. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 1403, 222 USPQ 939, 940-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“When the record shows that purchasers are confronted with more than one (let alone numerous) independent users of a term or device, an application for registration under Section 2(f) cannot be successful, for distinctiveness on which purchasers may rely is lacking under such circumstances.”); Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 11 USPQ2d 1355, 1357-58 (TTAB 1989) (“[T]he existence of numerous third party users of a mark, even if junior, might well have a material impact on the Examiner’s decision to accept a party’s claim of distinctiveness.”); Flowers Industries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 5 USPQ2d 1580, 1588-89 (TTAB 1987) (“[L]ong and continuous use alone is insufficient to show secondary meaning where the use is not substantially exclusive.”). The examining attorney previously attached third-party registrations using the word “HISTORY” in connection with similar goods/services, as well as evidence of applicant’s prior registration disclaiming exclusive rights to use “HISTORY” apart from the respective marks as shown.
Accordingly, applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness is denied. Additional evidence is needed.
Applicant should note the following regarding claims of acquired distinctiveness:
Evidence of acquired distinctiveness may include specific dollar sales under the mark, advertising figures, samples of advertising, consumer or dealer statements of recognition of the mark as a source identifier, affidavits, and any other evidence that establishes the distinctiveness of the mark as an indicator of source. See 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a); In re Ideal Indus., Inc., 508 F.2d 1336, 184 USPQ 487 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Instant Transactions Corp., 201 USPQ 957 (TTAB 1979); TMEP §§1212.06 et seq. The Office will decide each case on its own merits.
If additional evidence is submitted, the following factors are generally considered when determining acquired distinctiveness: (1) length and exclusivity of use of the mark in the United States by applicant; (2) the type, expense and amount of advertising of the mark in the United States; and (3) applicant’s efforts in the United States to associate the mark with the source of the goods and/or services, such as unsolicited media coverage and consumer studies. See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A showing of acquired distinctiveness need not consider all of these factors, and no single factor is determinative. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424; see TMEP §§1212 et seq.
Allegations of sales and advertising expenditures cannot per se establish that a term has acquired significance as a mark. It is necessary to examine the advertising material to determine how the term is used, the commercial impression created by such use, and the significance the term would have to prospective purchasers. TMEP §1212.06(b); see In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 53 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Packaging Specialists, Inc., 221 USPQ 917, 920 (TTAB 1984).
The ultimate test in determining acquisition of distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) is not applicant’s efforts, but applicant’s success in educating the public to associate the claimed mark with a single source. TMEP §1212.06(b); see In re Packaging Specialists,221 USPQ at 920; In re Redken Labs., Inc., 170 USPQ 526 (TTAB 1971).
More evidence is required where a mark is so highly descriptive that purchasers seeing the matter in relation to the named goods and/or services would be less likely to believe that it indicates source in any one party. See, e.g., In re Bongrain Int’l Corp., 894 F.2d 1316, 13 USPQ2d 1727 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Seaman & Assocs., Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1657 (TTAB 1986).
However, no amount of purported proof that a generic term has acquired secondary meaning can transform that term into a registrable trademark. Such a designation cannot become a trademark under any circumstances. See In re Bongrain, 894 F.2d at 1317 n.4, 13 USPQ2d at 1728 n.4; H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986); TMEP §1212.02(i).
Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive - Continued
The refusal to register of 11/1/08 because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature, characteristic, purpose and/or subject matter of applicant’s goods and services, is continued and maintained. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.
/RLF/
Ronald L. Fairbanks
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 117
(571) 272-9405
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail. For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney. Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.
If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.
STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.