To: | Chr. Hansen Inc. (usbst@chr-hansen.com) |
Subject: | TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77468263 - FRUITMAX - FruitMAX App |
Sent: | 8/21/2008 11:28:27 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM109@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 77/468263
MARK: FRUITMAX
|
|
CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
|
APPLICANT: Chr. Hansen Inc.
|
|
CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
|
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 8/21/2008
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62, 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See TMEP §1207.01. However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods and/or services are considered. These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers, and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and/or services. See Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01. In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b). In comparing the goods and/or services, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparison of the Marks
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).
The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source. In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark is the mark “FRUITMAX” for “Food color made from naturally occurring colorants for use in food and beverages” in IC 2.
Registrant’s mark is “FRUTAMAX” for “Drink mixes and fruit drinks, fruit flavored soft drinks, preparations and syrups for making fruit drinks and soft drinks, powders used in the preparation of soft drinks” in IC 32.
Applying the above analysis, the marks are substantially similar in appearance and commercial impression.
Comparison of the Goods
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source. In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In the present case, applicant's goods are closely related to registrant's goods because both goods are used in the preparation of beverages.
Since the marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of applicant's goods. Therefore, applicant's mark is not entitled to registration.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also TBC Corp. v. Holsa Inc., 126 F.3d 1470, 44 USPQ2d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (as the newcomer, applicant has the opportunity of avoiding confusion and is obligated to do so); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1181, 6 USPQ2d 2034, 2038 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A newcomer who has the 'entire material universe' or, stated in other terms, 'a whole dictionary full of words, an encyclopedia full of proper names, or a world atlas full of place names,' from which it could have chosen its name and mark, has the duty to avoid the use of a mark similar to an established one."); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (CCPA 1974); Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (USA) Inc. v. Elsea, 56 USPQ2d 1504, 1514 (TTAB 2000) (“It is a well-established principle that one who adopts a mark similar to the mark of another for the same or closely related goods or services does so at his own peril, and any doubt as to likelihood of confusion must be resolved against the newcomer and in favor of the prior user or registrant.”).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
POTENTIAL SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL
If applicant believes there is no potential conflict between this application and the earlier-filed application, then applicant may present arguments relevant to the issue in a response to this Office action. The election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue at a later point.
/Mrs. A. D. Saunders/
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 109
(571) 272-9349
(571) 272-9250 Trademark Assistance Center
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail. For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney. Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.
If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.
STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.