To: | CUPID FOUNDATIONS, INC. (trademarkadmin@ldlkm.com) |
Subject: | TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77408647 - DYNAMIC STRETCH SUPP - CUPID 10.0-1 |
Sent: | 6/9/2008 8:12:02 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM115@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 77/408647
MARK: DYNAMIC STRETCH SUPP
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
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APPLICANT: CUPID FOUNDATIONS, INC.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/9/2008
Serial Number: 77/408647 – DYNAMIC STRETCH SUPPORT
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62, 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1601663. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
The applicant has applied to register the proposed mark DYNAMIC STRETCH SUPPORT in standard character form for use on “panties, bras and shapewear, namely, control panties, girdles, body briefs and foundation garments.”
The registered mark is SUPPORT STRETCH in typed form for use on “intimate apparel, namely, bras.”
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See TMEP §1207.01. However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).
The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source. In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark DYNAMIC STRETCH SUPPORT and the registered mark SUPPORT STRETCH are substantially similar in overall commercial impression because the marks contain the transposition of terms STRETCH SUPPORT and SUPPORT STRETCH. Although the registered mark is registered on the Supplemental Register, even “weak” marks, e.g., laudatory or descriptive marks, are entitled to protection from registration of a confusingly similar mark for closely related goods or services. In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 198 USPQ 337 (CCPA 1978).
Comparison of the Goods and/or Services & Channels of Trade
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source. In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those goods. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01.
The goods of the parties are very closely related and identical in part. Both applicant and the registrant intend to use/use their respective marks on bras and applicant also intends to use its mark on other related intimate apparel. Thus, when marketed under substantially similar marks, consumers are likely to believe the goods of the applicant and the registrant emanate from the same source.
In summary, the similarities among the marks and the goods and/or services of the applicant and the registrant are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion among consumers. The examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979). Accordingly, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If the applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, the applicant must also respond to the following informalities.
INFORMALITIES
Disclaimer
The applicant must insert a disclaimer of STRETCH SUPPORT in the application because the wording is descriptive of a feature of the goods. See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). The attached excerpts retrieved from the Internet illustrate that undergarments are likely to have a stretch support feature.
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “STRETCH SUPPORT” apart from the mark as shown.
TMEP §1213.08(a)(i); see In re Owatonna Tool Co., 231 USPQ 493 (Comm’r Pats. 1983).
The following cases further explain the disclaimer requirement: Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 21 USPQ2d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Kraft, Inc., 218 USPQ 571 (TTAB 1983).
TELEPHONE FOR ASSISTANCE
If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.
/Alicia P. Collins/
Trademark Examining Attorney
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Law Office 115
(571) 272-9147
(571) 273-9147 (fax)
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office action should be filed using the form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.
If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.
STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.