UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/20/2008

 

 

TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE:  TEAS Plus applicants should submit the following documents using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html:  (1) written responses to Office actions; (2) preliminary amendments; (3) changes of correspondence address; (4) changes of owner’s address; (5) appointments and revocations of attorney; (6) amendments to allege use; (7) statements of use; (8) requests for extension of time to file a statement of use, and (9) requests to delete a §1(b) basis.  If any of these documents are filed on paper, they must be accompanied by a $50 per class fee.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(iv) and 2.23(a)(i).  Telephone responses will not incur an additional fee.  NOTE:  In addition to the above, applicant must also continue to accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process in order to avoid the additional fee.  37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(2).

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 5/7/08.

 

Registration was initially refused based upon a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration No. 3287931 pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d). In response, applicant argues (a) the marks are not similar in sight, sound or meaning, and (b) the registrant’s mark is weak and entitled to a narrow scope of protection. The examining attorney has reviewed the applicant’s arguments and evidence in support thereof, and is not persuaded. Accordingly, that refusal is continued and maintained.  However, prior to making the refusal final and based upon evidence provided by the applicant, the examining attorney notes the following additional refusal:

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3136019.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b).  The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods and/or services are considered.  These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers, and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and/or services.  See Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01.  In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).  In comparing the goods and/or services, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(vi).

 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant seeks registration of “FOOTY.”

 

The registered mark is “FOOTIE CHICK.”

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Mattel Inc. v. Funline Merch. Co., 81 USPQ2d 1372, 1374-75 (TTAB 2006); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

 

The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(b)(iii).  Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

 

Despite the applicant’s arguments that the marks have different meanings, a portion of the marks [FOOTIE/FOOTY] are similar sounding. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). Additionally, slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion.  In re Energy Telecomm. & Electrical Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350 (TTAB 1983).

 

Not only are the terms phonetic equivalents, but the attached dictionary definitions show that “footie” is an alternative spelling for “footy” [for the same meaning]. See attached definitions. Moreover, the word “chick” is slang for an attractive girl or young woman. See attached definitions. Similarly to the initial refusal [Footie Girl], the word “chick” appearing in the registrant’s mark would be suggestive of the target consumer for the goods.

 

Material obtained from the Internet is generally accepted as competent evidence in examination and ex parte proceedings.  See In re Rodale Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1696, 1700 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show genericness); In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654, 1662 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show false connection); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik”, 80 USPQ2d 1305, 1308-09 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show geographic significance); Fram Trak Indus. v. WireTracks LLC, 77 USPQ2d 2000, 2006 (TTAB 2006) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show relatedness of goods); In re Consol. Specialty Rest. Inc., 71 USPQ2d 1921, 1927-29 (TTAB 2004) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show that geographic location is well-known for particular goods); In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d 1792, 1793 (TTAB 2004) (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show surname significance); In re Fitch IBCA Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1058, 1060 (Internet evidence accepted by the Board to show descriptiveness); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b). 

 

Third-party registrations are entitled to little weight on the question of likelihood of confusion because they are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Moreover, the existence on the register of other seemingly similar marks does not provide a basis for registrability for the applied-for mark.  AMF, 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999).

 

Prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering different marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the Office.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi).  Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits.  See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Int’l Taste, Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1604, 1606 (TTAB 2000); In re Sunmarks, Inc., 32 USPQ2d 1470, 1472 (TTAB 1994).

 

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services.  This protection extends to marks registered on the Supplemental Register.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see, e.g., In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 18 USPQ 337 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Hunke & Jochheim, 185 USPQ 188 (TTAB 1975).

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods and/or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Indus., Inc., 210 USPQ 70, 78 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

Applicant provides “Track suits; Shirts; Caps; Sweaters; Shorts.”

 

The registrant provides “Articles of clothing, namely, waterproof and water-resistant clothing, namely, waders, gum boots, rainboots, rain shoes, raincoats, rain hats, rainsuits, wetsuits, rainsuits for motorcyclists, water-repellant gloves not for protective use, waterproof baby pants, anoraks, water-resistant jackets, water-resistant trousers, water-resistant socks, water-resistant capes; babies' and infants' wear namely singlets, vests, socks, booties, cardigans, suits, cloth diapers, pants, infant and toddler one-piece clothing, and playsuits; ladies' and girls wear namely jerseys, dresses, tops, pants, pullovers, combinations, coats, topcoats, trousers, frocks, jackets, jumpers, leggings, sport coats, briefs, petticoats, shirts, skirts, singlets, slips, suits, sweaters, pajamas, nightshirts, judo suits and karate suits, rainwear, snow suits, wet suits, swimwear, wristbands, cloth bibs, bathrobes, dressing gowns, beachwear, underwear, lingerie, bodices, brassieres, corsets, corselets, girdles, evening wear namely dresses and gowns, furs namely fur coats, jackets and stoles, paper clothing, namely disposable underwear, t-shirts; clothing for gymnastics, namely gym suits, jogging suits, sweat suits, track suits and training suits, clothing for fishing namely fishing vests, waders and anoraks, clothing for football, namely football shorts, shirts and socks, clothing for skiing, namely ski gloves, socks, suits, jackets and pants, tennis wear; clothing of leather and imitation leather, namely coats, jackets and trousers; uniforms and liveries, smocks, overalls, aprons; masquerade costumes; togas, saris, veils; belts and money belts, braces in the nature of suspenders, neckties, neckerchiefs, sashes, scarves, shawls, stoles, suspenders, garter belts and ankle garters, ear muffs, gloves, mittens; headgear, namely hats, caps, headbands, hoods, shower and bathing caps, sun visors. footwear, namely boots, shoes, slippers, sandals, foot muffs, socks, stockings, hosiery, tights, pantyhose.”

 

The parties’ goods are related and would be found in the same channels of trade [clothing].

 

The decisions in the clothing field have held many different types of apparel to be related under Section 2(d).  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 286 F.2d 623, 128 USPQ 549 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“WINTER CARNIVAL” for women’s boots v. men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233 (TTAB 1992) (“ELANCE” for underwear v. “ELAAN” for neckties); In re Melville Corp. 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991) (“ESSENTIALS” for women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets v. women’s shoes); In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (“NEWPORTS” for women’s shoes v. “NEWPORT” for outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397 (TTAB 1982) (“OMEGA” for hosiery v. trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444 (TTAB 1975) (“GRANADA” for men’s suits, coats, and trousers v. ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400 (TTAB 1964) (“SLEEX” for brassieres and girdles v. slacks for men and young men).

 

Further, any goods or services in the registrant’s normal fields of expansion must also be considered in order to determine whether the registrant’s goods or services are related to the applicant’s identified goods or services for purposes of analysis under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).  The test is whether purchasers would believe the product or service is within the registrant’s logical zone of expansion.  CPG Prods. Corp. v. Perceptual Play, Inc., 221 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(a)(v).

 

The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those goods.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01.

 

The Trademark Act not only guards against the misimpression that the senior user is the source of the junior user’s goods and/or services, but it also protects against “reverse confusion,” that is the junior user is the source of the senior user’s goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indust., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474-75, 31 USPQ2d 1592, 1597-98 (3d Cir. 1994); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490-91, 6 USPQ2d 1187, 1190-91 (2d Cir. 1988).

 

Accordingly, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d). Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

 

/RLF/

Ronald L. Fairbanks

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 117

(571) 272-9405

 

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office action should be filed using the form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                

IMPORTANT NOTICE

USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 6/20/2008 FOR

APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77237853

 

Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

  

VIEW OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow?DDA=Y&serial_number=77237853&doc_type=OOA&mail_date=20080620 (or copy and paste this URL into the address field of your browser), or visit http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action.

 

PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this notification.

 

RESPONSE MAY BE REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) if a response is required; (2) how to respond; and (3) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 6/20/2008.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System response form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm.

 

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail

TDR@uspto.gov.  Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action. 

 

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2. Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.