UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 8/30/2007

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and has determined the following:

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3131646.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

The marks are compared in their entireties under a Section 2(d) analysis.  Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).

 

Here, the applicant’s mark, BIRDIE plus design, is similar to the registered mark, BIRDIE BRAND GOLF, because both marks contain the similar distinct term “Birdie.” Although the applicant’s mark also contains stylized letters and design components, these portions of the mark are less significant in the Section 2d analysis.  The literal portions are generally the dominant and most significant features of marks because consumers will call for the goods or services in the marketplace by that portion.  In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); In re Drug Research Reports, Inc., 200 USPQ 554 (TTAB 1978).  For this reason, greater weight is often given to the literal portions of marks in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

Furthermore, although the registered mark also contains the terms “Brand Golf,” this language is disclaimed.  Disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  Although a disclaimed portion of a mark certainly cannot be ignored, and the marks must be compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant in creating a commercial impression.  In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re National Data Corporation, 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); and In re Appetito Provisions Co. Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987).  See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ 2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re El Torito Rests. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988); In re Equitable Bancorporation, 229 USPQ 709 (TTAB 1986).  Here, both the applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark feature the distinct term “Birdie” thereby creating the same overall commercial impression. 

 

Finally, the mere deletion of wording from a registered mark is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (where applicant filed to register the mark OPTIQUE for optical wear, deletion of the term BOUTIQUE is insufficient to distinguish the mark, per se, from the registered mark OPTIQUE BOUTIQUE when used in connection with competing optical wear).  In the present case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.  Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Similarity of the Goods

 

If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); ECI Division of E-Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The decisions in the clothing field have held many different types of apparel to be related under Section 2(d).  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 286 F.2d 623, 128 USPQ 549 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“WINTER CARNIVAL” for women’s boots v. men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233 (TTAB 1992) (“ELANCE” for underwear v. “ELAAN” for neckties); In re Melville Corp. 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991) (“ESSENTIALS” for women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets v. women’s shoes); In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (“NEWPORTS” for women’s shoes v. “NEWPORT” for outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397 (TTAB 1982) (“OMEGA” for hosiery v. trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444 (TTAB 1975) (“GRANADA” for men’s suits, coats, and trousers v. ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400 (TTAB 1964) (“SLEEX” for brassieres and girdles v. slacks for men and young men).

 

Here, the applicant’s goods, namely “jackets, golf apparel and sportswear” are closely related to the registrant’s goods, “clothing, namely shirts and visors” because the goods listed are articles of clothing.  Additionally, the applicant’s goods and the registrant’s goods are likely sold at retail clothing and department stores where a consumer might encounter both applicant’s and registrant’s goods.

 

Neither the application nor the registration contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., retail clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. V. KangaROOS U.S.A. Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994).  Consequently, consumers familiar with the registrant’s mark may assume, albeit falsely, that the goods offered under the applicant’s mark originate with the registrant.  Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

 

Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should note the following additional potential ground for refusal.

 

Prior Pending Applications

 

Information regarding pending Application Serial Nos. 78503915, 78922959 and 76664603 is enclosed.  The filing dates of the referenced applications precede applicant’s filing date.  There may be a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d) between applicant’s mark and the referenced marks.  If one or more of the referenced applications registers, registration may be refused in this case under Section 2(d).  37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon entry of a response to this Office action, action on this case may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed applications.

 

If applicant believes that there is no potential conflict between this application and the earlier-filed applications, then applicant may present arguments relevant to the issue in a response to this Office action.  The election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue at a later point.

 

If applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, then applicant must also respond to the following requirements.

 

Identification of Goods

 

The wording “golf apparel and sportswear” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because applicant must specify the apparel and sportswear items.  TMEP §1402.01. 

 

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate.

 

Class 025:          “Jackets; golf apparel and sportswear, namely {specify, e.g. golf caps, golf shirts, sports shirts}”

 

Please note that, while the identification of goods may be amended to clarify or limit the goods, adding to the goods or broadening the scope of the goods is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include goods that are not within the scope of the goods set forth in the present identification.

 

Claim of Ownership

 

If applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration No. 2456349, then applicant must submit a claim of ownership.  37 C.F.R. §2.36; TMEP §812.  The following standard format is suggested:

 

Applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration No. 2456349.

 

 

 

 

Specimen - ADVISORY

 

The specimen shows use of the federal trademark registration symbol ® with the applied-for mark.  However, USPTO records do not show that the mark is registered.  Applicant may not use the federal registration symbol until its mark is registered in the USPTO.  After registration, applicant may use this symbol in connection with the specific goods and/or services listed in the registration.  TMEP §§906, 906.02.

 

This information is advisory only.  Applicant need not respond to this issue.

 

 

 

 

 

/Natalie Polzer/

Natalie Polzer

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 108

Phone:  (571) 272-4103

 

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office Action should be filed using the Office’s Response to Office action form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm.  If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification.  Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

                                                                

IMPORTANT NOTICE

USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 8/30/2007 FOR

APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77174393

 

Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

  

VIEW OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow?DDA=Y&serial_number=77174393&doc_type=OOA&mail_date=20070830 (or copy and paste this URL into the address field of your browser), or visit http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action.

 

PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this notification.

 

RESPONSE MAY BE REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) if a response is required; (2) how to respond; and (3) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 8/30/2007.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System response form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm.

 

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail

TDR@uspto.gov.  Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action. 

 

        WARNING

1. The USPTO will NOT send a separate e-mail with the Office action attached.

 

2. Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.