Offc Action Outgoing

This action responds to applicant’s communication dated February 7, 2008, in which the applicant 1) amended its identification of goods; 2) added Class 35; 3) specified that it wished to maintain its foreign filing basis as well as the intent to use basis; and 4) submitted arguments against the likelihood of confusion refusal. Applicant’s amended identification of goods, addition of class 35, and filing basis statements are acceptable and have been made of record. After careful consideration of the applicant’s arguments, the Section 2(d) refusal is continued and is now made final.

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2594834. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously enclosed registration.

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis. First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

Comparison of the Marks

Applicant seeks to register OVERLANDER. The registered mark is OVERLAND. Applicant’s mark and the registrant’s mark are similar because they contain the identical term OVERLAND. It is this portion of the mark that consumers are likely to recall. The only difference in the marks is the applicant’s addition of the suffix –ER to the end of the term. This addition does not obviate the similarities of the marks.

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark. See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).

Applicant argues that the marks are not identical and do not sound the same. However, the question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b). Here, the terms OVERLANDER and OVERLAND create the same overall commercial impression.

Applicant also argues that OVERLAND is a weak mark and entitled to a narrow scope of protection. However, even if applicant has shown that the cited mark is “weak,” such marks are still entitled to protection against registration by a subsequent user of the same or similar mark for the same or closely related goods or services. See Hollister Incorporated v. Ident A Pet, Inc., 193 USPQ 439 (TTAB 1976) and cases cited therein.

Comparison of the Goods/Services

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source. On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods. See In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (BIGG’S for retail grocery and general merchandise store services held confusingly similar to BIGGS for furniture); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women’s clothing store services and clothing held likely to be confused with CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms); In re United Service Distributors, Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (design for distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids held likely to be confused with design for skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB for various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing held likely to be confused with THE “21” CLUB (stylized) for restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (STEELCARE INC. for refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery held likely to be confused with STEELCASE for office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (use of similar marks for trucking services and on motor trucks and buses is likely to cause confusion).

Applicant seeks to use its mark to identify “all-terrain vehicles” and “dealerships in the field of all-terrain vehicles.” The registered mark is used to identify “motor vehicles, namely, automobiles, trucks and sport utility vehicles and structural parts thereof.” Applicant’s goods and services are closely related to the registrant’s goods because both feature land vehicles that are typically sold together. The attached twenty (20) U.S. registrations demonstrate that the same marks are frequently used to identify automobiles, trucks, and/or sport utility vehicles as well as all-terrain vehicles. These registrations have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein are of a kind that may emanate from a single source. See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).

See the previously attached ten (10) U.S. Registrations demonstrating that automobiles and all-terrain vehicles are sold under the same marks. Also see the previously attached Internet websites showing the same marks used to sell both all-terrain vehicles and automobiles.

Applicant argues that the goods are sold in different channels of trade and that the same consumers would not simultaneously encounter the applicant’s and the registrant’s goods/services. However, the attached websites demonstrate that the same dealerships often sell cars, trucks, and/or sport utility vehicles as well as all-terrain vehicles. See the attached five websites. Therefore the same consumers would be exposed to the applicant’s and the registrant’s goods/services.

Applicant also argues that the consumers of the parties’ goods are knowledgeable and exercise care in their purchasing decisions, and as such, would not be easily confused as to the source of origin. However, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii).

Therefore, the same consumers will be exposed to the goods/services identified with the marks. The similarities among the marks and the goods/services of the parties are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion. The examining attorney must resolve any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion in favor of the prior registrant. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i). Accordingly, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

Response Guidelines

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond to this final action by:

(1) submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

(2) filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2). 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters. The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

/Michael Litzau/

Michael Litzau

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 104

tel: 571-272-8157

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office action should be filed using the form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

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