Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  77/120789

 

TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE:  TEAS Plus applicants should submit the following documents using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html:  (1) written responses to Office actions; (2) preliminary amendments; (3) changes of correspondence address; (4) changes of owner’s address; (5) appointments and revocations of attorney; (6) amendments to allege use; (7) statements of use; (8) requests for extension of time to file a statement of use, and (9) requests to delete a §1(b) basis.  If any of these documents are filed on paper, they must be accompanied by a $50 per class fee.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(iv) and 2.23(a)(i).  Telephone responses will not incur an additional fee.  NOTE:  In addition to the above, applicant must also continue to accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process in order to avoid the additional fee.  37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(2).

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and has determined the following.

 

Refusal:  Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion

 

The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the applicant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods/services, so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3006315 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.  TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

A likelihood of confusion determination requires a two-part analysis.  First the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

In the present instance, the proposed mark is STRIKE ZONE CHANNEL and design for entertainment, namely a continuing sports show broadcast over television, satellite, audio, and video media; entertainment, namely, television news shows; and production and distribution of television shows and movies while the registered mark is STRIKE ZONE WWW.FLORIDA MARLINS.COM for entertainment services, namely, providing television programs featuring professional baseball games featuring Florida Marlins baseball.  The proposed mark and the  registered mark share the significant common term STRIKE ZONE.  Furthermore, the services offered by the applicant and registrant are closely related.

 

Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

As a general rule, consumers are more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).

 

The literal portions of both marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound and meaning.  The addition of the design element does not obviate the similarity between the marks in this case.  In re Shell Oil Company, 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods or services as they are identified in the application and the registration.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993); J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 18 USPQ2d 1889 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Octocom Systems Inc. v. Houston Computer Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  Since the identification of the applicant’s goods and/or services is very broad, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including those in the registrant’s more specific identification, that they move in all normal channels of trade and that they are available to all potential customers.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Accordingly, the proposed mark has been refused under Section 2(d).

 

 

Please see below for additional ground of refusal.

 

Section 2(e)(1) Merely Descriptive Refusal

 

The examining attorney refuses registration on the Principal Register because the proposed mark merely describes the goods/services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); TMEP §§1209 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the relevant goods and/or services.  In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987);  In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 229 USPQ 818 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re MetPath Inc., 223 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1984); In re Bright‑Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979); TMEP §1209.01(b).  A mark that describes an intended user of a product or service is also merely descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1).  Hunter Publishing Co. v. Caulfield Publishing Ltd., 1 USPQ2d 1996 (TTAB 1986); In re Camel Mfg. Co., Inc., 222 USPQ 1031 (TTAB 1984); In re Gentex Corp., 151 USPQ 435 (TTAB 1966).

 

In the present instance, the proposed mark is STRIKE ZONE CHANNEL for entertainment, namely a continuing sports show broadcast over television, satellite, audio, and video media; entertainment, namely, television news shows; and production and distribution of television shows and movies. 

 

The wording is merely descriptive because STRIKE ZONE is merely descriptive of a feature of baseball games and the tern CHANNEL is merely descriptive of a characteristic of television or broadcasting related services.  Please see attached definitions.

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (CONCURRENT PC-DOS found merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where relevant trade uses the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of this particular type of operating system); see TMEP §1209.01(b).

 

For the purpose of a Section 2(e)(1) analysis, a term need not describe all of the purposes, functions, characteristics or features of the goods and/or services to be merely descriptive.  In re Dial-a-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  It is enough if the term describes only one significant function, attribute or property.  In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.”) (quoting In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).

 

A mark that combines descriptive terms may be registrable if the composite creates a unitary mark with a separate, nondescriptive meaning.  In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 157 USPQ 382 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding SUGAR & SPICE not to be merely descriptive of bakery products).  However, the mere combination of descriptive words does not automatically create a new nondescriptive word or phrase.  E.g., In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (TTAB 1988) (finding GROUP SALES BOX OFFICE descriptive for theater ticket sales services).  The registrability of a mark created by combining only descriptive words depends on whether a new and different commercial impression is created, and/or the mark so created imparts an incongruous meaning as used in connection with the goods and/or services.  Where, as in the present case, the combination of the descriptive words creates no incongruity, and no imagination is required to understand the nature of the goods and/or services, the mark is merely descriptive.  E.g., In re Copytele Inc., 31 USPQ2d 1540, 1542 (TTAB 1994); Associated Theatre Clubs, 9 USPQ2d at 1662. 

 

See, e.g., In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314 (TTAB 2002) (SMARTTOWER merely descriptive of “commercial and industrial cooling towers and accessories therefor, sold as a unit”); In re Sun Microsystems Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1084 (TTAB 2001) (AGENTBEANS merely descriptive of “computer software for use in development and deployment of application programs on a global computer network”); In re Putman Publ’g Co., 39 USPQ2d 2021 (TTAB 1996) (FOOD & BEVERAGE ON-LINE merely descriptive of news and information service for the food processing industry); In re Copytele Inc., 31 USPQ2d 1540 (TTAB 1994) (SCREEN FAX PHONE merely descriptive of facsimile terminals employing electrophoretic displays); In re Entenmann’s Inc., 15 USPQ2d 1750 (TTAB 1990) (OATNUT held to be merely descriptive of bread containing oats and hazelnuts).

 

Accordingly, the proposed mark is refused under Section 2(e)(1).

 

Advisory – Section 1(b) Application Not Eligible for Supplemental Register Until Allegation of Use is Filed

 

A mark in an application under Trademark Act Section 1(b) is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use under 37 C.F.R. §2.76 or statement of use under 37 C.F.R. §2.88 has been filed.  37 C.F.R. §§2.47(d) and 2.75(b); TMEP §1102.03.  When a Section 1(b) application is amended to the Supplemental Register, the effective filing date of the application is the date of filing of the allegation of use.  37 C.F.R. §2.75(b); TMEP §§206.01 and 1102.03.

 

 

 

/sshih/

Sally Shih

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

USPTO

(tel) 571-272-9712

(fax) 571-273-9106

 

 

 

NOTICE OF NEW PROCEDURE FOR E-MAILED OFFICE ACTIONS:  In late spring 2007, for any applicant who authorizes e-mail communication with the USPTO, the USPTO will no longer directly e-mail the actual Office action to the applicant.  Instead, upon issuance of an Office action, the USPTO will e-mail the applicant a notice with a link/web address to access the Office action using Trademark Document Retrieval (TDR), which is located on the USPTO website at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.  The Office action will not be attached to the e-mail notice.  Upon receipt of the notice, the applicant can then view and print the actual Office action and any evidentiary attachments using the provided link/web address.  TDR is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, including holidays and weekends.  This new process is intended to eliminate problems associated with e-mailed Office actions that contain numerous attachments.

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.