To: | Crayola Properties, Inc. (lschuv1@hallmark.com) |
Subject: | TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77113819 - COTTON CANDY - N/A |
Sent: | 3/22/2007 10:22:07 AM |
Sent As: | ECOM101@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 77/113819
APPLICANT: Crayola Properties, Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RETURN ADDRESS: Commissioner for Trademarks P.O. Box 1451 Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
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MARK: COTTON CANDY
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: N/A
CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: |
Please provide in all correspondence:
1. Filing date, serial number, mark and applicant's name. 2. Date of this Office Action. 3. Examining Attorney's name and Law Office number. 4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.
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MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION: If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.
Serial Number 77/113819
TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE: TEAS Plus applicants should submit the following documents using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html: (1) written responses to Office actions; (2) preliminary amendments; (3) changes of correspondence address; (4) changes of owner’s address; (5) appointments and revocations of attorney; (6) amendments to allege use; (7) statements of use; (8) requests for extension of time to file a statement of use, and (9) requests to delete a §1(b) basis. If any of these documents are filed on paper, they must be accompanied by a $50 per class fee. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(iv) and 2.23(a)(i). Telephone responses will not incur an additional fee. NOTE: In addition to the above, applicant must also continue to accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process in order to avoid the additional fee. 37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(2).
The assigned examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and determined the following.
Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2805253. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services. TMEP §1207.01. The Court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services. The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant. In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis. First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In the present case, the applicant seeks registration of the mark “COTTON CANDY” for “crayons.” The cited mark is “COTTON CANDY” for “lined and unlined drawing or writing papers, printing papers, bond papers, stationery, index cards, note tablets, poster papers, poster boards, sketch papers, chart papers, notebooks, easel tablets, construction papers, fingerpaint papers; papers used for printing, painting, or illustrational purposes; and kits containing assortments of papers for drawing, printing, painting, or illustrational purposes.”
The marks are obviously identical. Given this fact, the goods are sufficiently related. If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).
The goods of the applicant and registrant are of the type to be offered together and used together. In support, the examining attorney attaches applicant’s own prior registrations where both kinds of goods are offered, namely, crayons and different types of paper. Attached are also web page printouts from applicant’s website showing both kinds of goods offered under the same trademark.
The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those goods. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and cases cited therein.
Accordingly, registration is refused under Trademark Act, Section 2(d).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
Registration is refused because the proposed mark, as used on the specimen of record, merely identifies a color designation; it does not function as a trademark to identify and distinguish applicant’s goods from those of others and to indicate their source. Trademark Act Sections 1, 2 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1052 and 1127; In re Dana Corp., 12 USPQ2d 1748 (TTAB 1989); TMEP §1202.10.
Matter used as a model, style, color, or grade designation serves only to describe the particular product in terms of its quality, size, color or type, and does not identify the source of the goods. However, if the matter sought to be registered has come to be perceived by consumers as a source indicator in addition to its other function as a color designation, the term may be registrable as a trademark. In re Petersen Mfg. Co., 229 USPQ 466, 468 (TTAB 1986).
The specimen shows the proposed mark used on a crayon. This crayon is sold with other crayons inside of a box. When purchasing the crayons, consumers cannot see the wording “COTTON CANDY” and they do not call for the goods by the wording “COTTON CANDY.” When buying the goods and calling for the goods, consumers would recognize and ask for “Crayola®” crayons, or something similar. It is only after purchasing the crayons and opening the box does a consumer see the proposed mark. Considering that the wording appears where color designations for crayons are typically placed, consumers would immediately understand that “COTTON CANDY” was the color designation, albeit a creative one.
In support, the examining attorney refers to the previously mentioned web pages from applicant’s website that show crayons. It is obvious that the crayons are contained in a box. The names of the colors are not visible and nowhere on the box is there mention of the colors contained therein.
Accordingly, registration is refused under Trademark Act, Section 1, 2 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1052 and 1127.
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusals to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Applicant may respond to the refusal under Trademark Act, Section 1, 2 and 45 by claiming acquired distinctiveness by submitting evidence that the proposed mark has become distinctive of applicant’s goods in commerce. 15 U.S.C. §1052(f). Evidence may consist of examples of advertising and promotional materials that specifically promote, as a trademark, the mark for which registration is sought; dollar figures for advertising devoted to such promotion; dealer and consumer statements of recognition of the proposed mark as a trademark; and any other evidence that establishes recognition of the proposed mark as a trademark for the goods. TMEP §1212.06 et seq
In other words, the evidence must show use, promotion, and recognition of the actual wording “COTTON CANDY” for crayons. Long use alone is not sufficient in this particular case to establish acquired distinctiveness because the mark fails to function.
If applicant cannot claim acquired distinctiveness, applicant may amend the Section 1(a) filing basis (use in commerce) to Section 1(b) (intent to use), and the refusal will be withdrawn. However, should applicant amend the basis to Section 1(b), registration cannot be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use with a proper specimen. 15 U.S.C. §1051(c); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP Chapter 1100. If the same specimen is submitted with an allegation of use, the same refusal will issue.
In order to amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or a signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “Applicant has had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services listed in the application as of the filing date of the application.” 15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(2) and 2.35(b)(1); TMEP §806.01(b).
/Jean H. Im/
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 101
571-272-9303
jean.im@uspto.gov
HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:
STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.
VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.