UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 77/057391
APPLICANT: Travelers Property Casualty Corp.
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RETURN ADDRESS: Commissioner for Trademarks P.O. Box 1451 Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
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MARK: TRAVELERS CONCIERGECLAIM
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: N/A
CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: |
Please provide in all correspondence:
1. Filing date, serial number, mark and applicant's name. 2. Date of this Office Action. 3. Examining Attorney's name and Law Office number. 4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.
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MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION: If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.
Serial Number 77/057391
Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2956202 and 3083997. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registrations. The applicant’s proposed mark is “CONCIERGECLAIM” for “Insurance services, namely, insurance claims processing.” Registration Nos. 2956202 and 3083997 are “CONCIERGE-LEVEL CLAIMS SERVICES” for “adjusting and processing of property and casualty insurance claims made by policyholders.”
Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods and/or services are considered. Industrial Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers, and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and/or services. In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In comparing the goods and/or services, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755, 757 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In spite of the distinctive term TRAVELERS in applicant’s mark, a significant portion of applicant’s mark still appropriates the registered marks. Both marks share the wording “CONCIERGE” and “CLAIM,” the terms are spelled identically and appear in the same ordering in both marks, giving the marks a highly similar sound and appearance. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark. See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).
The applicant’s entire proposed mark is comprised of a compound term consisting of the most distinguishable term of the registrant’s mark paired with a term that is generic for the type of services rendered by the applicant and registrant in its singular form. The applicant proposes to strip away two lesser distinguishable elements of the registrant’s marks to market identical services. The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (where applicant filed to register the mark OPTIQUE for optical wear, deletion of the term BOUTIQUE is insufficient to distinguish the mark, per se, from the registered mark OPTIQUE BOUTIQUE when used in connection with competing optical wear). In the present case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.
The highly similar sound and appearance shared by the marks result in a highly similar meaning for consumers in the market for insurance services and create a confusingly similar commercial impression between the marks at issue in this case.
The applicant has broadly identified its services as “insurance claims processing.” The applicant’s identified services include the processing of any type of insurance claims, including the “property and casualty insurance claims made by policyholders” processing services identified by the Registrant here.
Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods or services as they are identified in the application and the registration. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993); J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 18 USPQ2d 1889 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Octocom Systems Inc. v. Houston Computer Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Since the identification of the applicant’s goods and/or services is very broad, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including those in the registrant’s more specific identification, that they move in all normal channels of trade and that they are available to all potential customers. TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
The identical nature of the applicant and registrant’s services makes the highly similar marks even more closely related in this case. If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); ECI Division of E-Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980); TMEP §1207.01(b). The applicant proposes to use its confusingly similar mark to market identical services to the same target group of consumers in the same channels of trade, to do so would result in a likelihood of confusion in this case.
When the confusingly similar commercial impression shared by the marks in this case are combined with the nearly identical services rendered by the applicant and the registrant, a likelihood of confusion results, supporting a Section 2(d) Refusal in this case.
/John Hwang/
Trademark Attorney
LAW OFFICE 114
571-272-9452
571-273-9114 FAX
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