UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  77/040861

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and has determined the following:

 

SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL

 

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2421147.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

 

SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS

 

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s proposed mark is ATMA.  Registration No. 2421147 is for ATMAYOGA.

 

Here, both marks share the identical term ATMA.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).  Further, the applicant has merely deleted the term YOGA from the registered mark.  The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (where applicant filed to register the mark OPTIQUE for optical wear, deletion of the term BOUTIQUE is insufficient to distinguish the mark, per se, from the registered mark OPTIQUE BOUTIQUE when used in connection with competing optical wear).  In the present case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

 

The marks share the similar term ATMA, and the applicant has merely deleted the descriptive term YOGA from the registered mark.  Thus, the marks are similar in meaning and overall commercial impression.  Consumers who encounter the marks are likely to believe they originate from the same source.  Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

SIMILARITY OF GOODS/SERVICES

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The applicant’s services are listed as “Instruction in Alexander Technique, Intuitive Dance, Integral Yoga, Tai Chi Chuan, Chi Kung, and Meditative Movement practices.”  The registrant’s services are “educational services, namely, teaching yoga, stress reduction, meditation, and holistic health; conducting retreats, workshops and seminars and distributing a teacher training curriculum and instructional and educational materials in connection therein regarding those services; training and certifying teachers who provide yoga services; educational services in the nature of creating an academy of yoga teachers.”

 

Here, the applicant and the registrant offer identical services, namely yoga instruction.  As the services are so closely related, consumers are likely to encounter these services through the same marketing channels, and through similar channels of trade.  Therefore, as the marks are highly similar, and the services overlap, consumers are likely to believe the services are offered by the same source. 

 

Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

CONCLUSION

 

Therefore, because of the similarity in sound, appearance, connotation and overall commercial impression of the applicant’s mark and the registered mark, and because the applicant’s services are related to the registrant’s services, consumers encountering those services are likely to believe they are provided by a common source.  Accordingly, registration is refused.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) – DESCRIPTIVE REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because the proposed mark merely describes a characteristic or feature of the applicant’s services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); TMEP §§1209 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the relevant goods and/or services.  In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987);  In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 229 USPQ 818 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re MetPath Inc., 223 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1984); In re Bright‑Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979); TMEP §1209.01(b).  A mark that describes an intended user of a product or service is also merely descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1).  Hunter Publishing Co. v. Caulfield Publishing Ltd., 1 USPQ2d 1996 (TTAB 1986); In re Camel Mfg. Co., Inc., 222 USPQ 1031 (TTAB 1984); In re Gentex Corp., 151 USPQ 435 (TTAB 1966).

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  In re Polo International Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (Board found that DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (CONCURRENT PC-DOS found merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk;” it is unnecessary that programs actually run “concurrently,” as long as relevant trade clearly uses the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of this particular type of operating system); In re Venture Lending Associates, 226 USPQ 285 (TTAB 1985); In re American Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985) (“Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test”); TMEP §1209.01(b).

 

Here, the applicant’s services include yoga instruction.  The examining attorney attaches evidence that ATMA is a descriptive term for a particular yoga technique.  (See attached websites).  According to this evidence, “Atma” refers to a particular yoga technique that is “a contemplative, soul-centered way of yoga developed by Christopher Ken Baxter and his colleagues in the fields of physical therapy and sports fitness, allopathic and complementary medicine, Buddhist meditation and Hatha Yoga.”  (See attached web page).  The term “Atma” is now used throughout the industry to describe this particular type of yoga technique.

 

As the applicant offers yoga instruction, consumers who encounter the applicant’s mark are likely to associate the term with its descriptive meaning in relation to yoga services.  Descriptiveness is considered in relation to the relevant goods and/or services.  The fact that a term may have different meanings in other contexts is not controlling on the question of descriptiveness.  In re Chopper Industries, 222 USPQ 258 (TTAB 1984); In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979); In re Champion International Corp., 183 USPQ 318 (TTAB 1974); TMEP §1209.03(e).

 

Thus, as ATMA is merely descriptive of a particular characteristic or feature of the applicant’s instructional services, registration is refused on these grounds.

 

 

Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

                       

If applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, then applicant must also respond to the following requirement(s).

 

MARK DIFFERS ON DRAWING AND SPECIMEN

 

The mark on the drawing page does not agree with the mark as it appears on the specimen.  The mark submitted for registration must be a substantially exact representation of the mark that appears on the specimen.  37 C.F.R. §2.51. 

 

In this case, the drawing displays the mark as ATMA, while the specimens shows the mark as ALEXANDER TECHNIQUE MOVING ARTS CENTRE (ATMA) and ATMA CENTRE.  Here, the applicant has added additional wording to the drawing ATMA, which materially alter the mark.  Consumers are unlikely to perceive ATMA alone as the service mark, due to the presence of the additional wording.

 

Applicant may not submit an amended drawing to conform to the display on the specimen because the character of the mark would be materially altered; in other words, the mark on the specimen creates a different commercial impression from the mark on the drawing.  37 C.F.R. §2.72(a); TMEP §§807.12, 807.12(a), 807.14 et seq. and 904.09. 

 

Therefore, applicant must submit the following:

 

(1)   A substitute specimen that shows the mark that appears on the drawing; and

 

(2)   The following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute specimen was in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.”  37 C.F.R. §2.59(a); TMEP §904.09.  If submitting a specimen requires an amendment to the dates of use, applicant must also verify the amended dates.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(c).

 

If applicant cannot satisfy the above requirements, applicant may amend the Section 1(a) filing basis (use in commerce) to Section 1(b) (intent to use basis), for which no specimen is required.  However, should applicant amend the basis to Section 1(b), registration cannot be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use with a proper specimen.  15 U.S.C. §1051(c); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP Chapter 1100. 

 

In order to amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “Applicant has had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services listed in the application as of the filing date of the application.”  15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(2) and 2.35(b)(1); TMEP §806.01(b).

 

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL – FAILS TO FUNCTION AS A SERVICE MARK

 

Registration is refused because the proposed mark, as used on the specimen of record, does not function as a service mark to identify and distinguish applicant’s services from those of others and to indicate their source.  Trademark Act Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1053 and 1127; see In re Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 13 USPQ2d 2043 (TTAB 1989); In re The Signal Cos., 228 USPQ 956 (TTAB 1986); In re Hughes Aircraft Co., 222 USPQ 263 (TTAB 1984); TMEP §§1301.02 et seq.

 

The mark, as shown on the specimen, does not function as a service mark because consumers would not distinguish the proposed mark ATMA as the source indicator for the applicant’s services.  Specifically, the applicant submitted one specimen, a teacher training program booklet, which displays the mark as ALEXANDER TECHNIQUE MOVING ARTS CENTRE (ATMA).  Here, consumers would not perceive ATMA alone as the source indicator for the services.  The next specimen appears to be an address label showing the mark beneath the name “Sumi Komo” as ATMA CENTRE.  Again, ATMA is used as the name of a building, and not in a way that serves as a source indicator for instructional services.  The last specimen appears to be a business card in which the mark again appears as ALEXANDER TECHNIQUE MOVING ARTS CENTRE (ATMA).  This does not indicate service mark use because consumers are unlikely to perceive ATMA as the source indicator of the services, but rather the entire title ALEXANDER TECHNIQUE MOVING ARTS CENTRE (ATMA). 

 

The specimen of record, along with any other relevant evidence submitted with the application, is reviewed and analyzed in order to determine whether a term is being properly used as a service mark.  In re Volvo Cars of North America, 46 USPQ2d 1455 (TTAB 1998); In re Morganroth, 208 USPQ 284 (TTAB 1980).  Not all words, designs, symbols or slogans used in the sale or advertising of goods or services function as marks, even though they may have been adopted with the intent to do so.  A designation cannot be registered unless ordinary purchasers would be likely to regard it as an indicator of origin for the services identified in the application.  In re Moody’s Investors Service Inc., 13 USPQ2d 2043 (TTAB 1989); TMEP §§1301.02 et seq.

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by submitting the following:

 

(1)   A substitute specimen showing the mark in use in commerce for the services specified in the application; and

 

(2)   The following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute specimen was in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.”  37 C.F.R. §2.59(a); TMEP §904.09.  If submitting a specimen requires an amendment to the dates of use, applicant must also verify the amended dates.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(c).

 

Examples of specimens for services are signs, photographs, brochures, website printouts or advertisements that show the mark used in the sale or advertising of the services.  TMEP §§1301.04 et seq.

 

If applicant cannot satisfy the above requirements, applicant may amend the Section 1(a) filing basis (use in commerce) to Section 1(b) (intent to use), and the refusal will be withdrawn.  However, should applicant amend the basis to Section 1(b), registration cannot be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use with a proper specimen.  15 U.S.C. §1051(c); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP Chapter 1100.  If the same specimen is submitted with an allegation of use, the same refusal will issue. 

 

In order to amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or a signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “Applicant has had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services listed in the application as of the filing date of the application.”  15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(2) and 2.35(b)(1); TMEP §806.01(b).

 

 

RESPONDING TO THIS OFFICE ACTION

 

Please note that there is no required format or form for responding to this Office action.  However, applicant should include the following information on all correspondence with the Office:  (1) the name and law office number of the examining attorney; (2) the serial number of this application; (3) the mailing date of this Office action; and, (4) applicant's telephone number.

 

When responding to this Office action, applicant must make sure to respond in writing to each refusal and requirement raised.  If there is a refusal to register the proposed mark, then applicant may wish to argue against the refusal, i.e., explain why it should be withdrawn and why the mark should register.  If there are other requirements, then applicant should simply set forth in writing the required changes or statements and request that the Office enter them into the application record.  Applicant must also sign and date its response.

 

If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

/Amy Brozenic/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 103

Phone - (571) 272-5862

Fax - (571) 273-5862

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.