UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  77/000934

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and has determined the following:

 

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1627982 and 1911078.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

A likelihood of confusion determination requires a two-part analysis.  First the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

When determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d), the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but rather whether the marks will confuse the people into believing that the goods they identify emanate from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b). 

 

In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755, 757 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. When the applicant’s mark is compared to a registered mark, “the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference.”  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956).  TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark POWERPLUS is nearly identical to the registrant’s mark POWER PLUS in Reg. No. 1627982 and will lead to consumer confusion.  Specifically, the marks contain the same two terms POWER and PLUS together, and thus share the identical sound, a nearly identical appearance, and the identical meaning.  The only minor difference between the marks is the space between the common terms POWER and PLUS in registrant’s mark.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). 

 

Similarly, the applicant’s mark POWERPLUS is nearly identical to the registrant’s mark POWER PLUS + in Reg. No. 1911078 and will lead to consumer confusion.  Again the only difference between the marks is in the appearance of the terms POWER and PLUS (compressed together) and the addition of the symbol “+,” which is reflected in the word PLUS in each mark and does not significantly change the commercial impression.

 

Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, then the commercial relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties must be analyzed carefully to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); In re Concordia Int’l Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Comparison of the Goods and Services

 

When determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods and/or services are considered.  Industrial Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and/or services.  In comparing the goods and/or services, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner.  In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755, 757 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The applicant’s goods and/or services are “Engines for motorcycles.”

 

The registrant’s goods and/or services in Reg. No. 1627982 are “Marine engines.”

 

The registrant’s goods and/or services in Reg. No. 1911078 are “high performance aftermarket land vehicle hard parts and accessories; namely, spark plugs, ignition systems, all for internal combustion engines,” and “high performance aftermarket land vehicle hard parts and accessories; namely, air cleaners, oil filters, cams, intake and exhaust systems.”

 

Applicant’s goods and each of the registrants’ goods are highly related as to cause confusion.  As to Reg. No. 1627982 (POWER PLUS), the registrant’s marine engines are manufactured by the same entities as the applicant’s motorcycle engines.  Both are within the general small engine field, and consumers familiar with one would believe that the other was manufactured by the same entity given the similarity of the marks.  See the attached evidence of copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely marine and motorcycle engines, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).  Also included is Internet evidence that the same people service these goods. 

 

As to Reg. No. 1911078, the registrant’s goods are a number of parts which are “all for internal combustion engines” and related goods in Class 12 for vehicle engines.  These goods will travel through the same channels of trade as applicant’s POWERPLUS engines, and the consumer confronted with POWER PLUS + will believe that these parts emanate from the same source as the other party.  These highly similar marks will appear on highly related goods, causing a strong likelihood of confusion.

 

Accordingly, registration of applicant’s mark is refused under Section 2(d).

 

Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

Finally, the Examining Attorney is not bound by past decisions of the Trademark Examining Operation.  In re Shapely, Inc., 231 USPQ 72, 75 (TTAB 1986).  The Examining Attorney must resolve any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion in favor of the prior registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark that is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir., 1988).  TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should also note the following prior pending application(s).

 

Possible Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Information regarding pending Application Serial No. 78972716 is enclosed.  The filing date of the referenced application precedes applicant’s filing date.  There may be a likelihood of confusion between the two marks under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  If the referenced application registers, registration may be refused in this case under Section 2(d).  37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon entry of a response to this Office action, action on this case may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed application.

 

If applicant believes there is no potential conflict between this application and the earlier-filed application, then applicant may present arguments relevant to the issue in a response to this Office action.  The election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue at a later point.

 

Response

 

If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this action, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

/Peter Bromaghim/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

Phone: (571)-272-8912

Fax: (571)-273-8912

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.