Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 23, 2009.

 

The applicant’s submitted substitute specimen is accepted and made of record.

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 3033101.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

 

Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal Made FINAL

 

The following Final refusal is limited to the goods identified in International Class 9 ONLY.

 

Applicant is seeking registration of the mark GLANCE for use in connection with “sunglasses” and “jewelry.”   In the first office action dated July 1, 2009, registration of the proposed mark was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act due to a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3033101.

 

In applicant’s July 23, 2009, correspondence, applicant argued against the likelihood of confusion, arguing primarily that the registrant, the United States Army, markets its goods to a different audience and the marks co-existed on the register for over four years.  The examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant’s arguments and evidence as to the likelihood of confusion refusal and is unpersuaded.  Therefore, for the reasons below, the likelihood of confusion refusal is made FINAL.

 

General Principles in Determining Likelihood of Confusion

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b).  The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark is GLANCE in standard character.  The cited mark is ATTA GLANCE in standard character.

 

The marks are compared in their entireties under a Trademark Act Section 2(d) analysis.  See TMEP §1207.01(b).  Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, the marks contain the same dominant wording, “glance.”  The proposed mark merely deletes the phonetic representation of the preposition “at a.”  The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(b)(iii).  Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

 

Furthermore, this additional wording in the cited registration merely modifies the shared wording in the mark.  The overall commercial impression created by the marks remains highly similar, namely that the goods encourage a “quick look.” Therefore, the marks are highly similar and are likely to cause confusion when used on the same or similar goods.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The applicant seeks registration of its mark for use in connection with “sunglasses,” in International Class 9. 

 

The registrant’s identified goods are “sunglasses.”

 

The respective parties have each identified their goods as “sunglasses.”  Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods as they are identified in the application and registration.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267-68, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.4, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  The applicant argues that the registrant markets its products to a different market segment than the applicant, based solely on the nature of the applicant itself.  The identification contained in the registration makes no limitations to the intended consumer of the registrant’s products.  Therefore, the goods of the respective parties are presumed to be identical and to move in the same channels of trade and marketed to the same end consumer.

 

The applicant further argues that the marks co-existed on the register for over four years.  This evidence is not persuasive in this instance.  Prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the Office.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi).  Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits.  See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Int’l Taste, Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1604, 1606 (TTAB 2000); In re Sunmarks, Inc., 32 USPQ2d 1470, 1472 (TTAB 1994).

 

When the goods of the respective parties are identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would be required with diverse goods.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Conclusion

 

In the present case, the marks contain the same dominant terms, conveying a similar commercial impression, and are used in connection with identical goods.  For the foregoing reasons, the likelihood of confusion refusal in International Class 9 is made FINAL.

 

Proper Response to This Final Action

 

If applicant does not respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action, International Class 9 will be deleted from the application by Examiner’s Amendment.  The application will then proceed for International Class 14 only.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).

 

Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

 

(1)  Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)  Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

/Nicholas A Coleman/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 115

Office: 571-272-4917

Fax: 571-273-9115

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail.  For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney.  Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.