Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

PLEASE NOTE: This Office action supersedes the previously issued Final Office Action, which was incomplete and was issued inadvertently.

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 13, 2009.

 

Section 2(d)—Likelihood of Confusion Refusal---FINAL

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), on the grounds that applicant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the identified services, so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2947713 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.  TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  The cited registration was sent previously.  Although the trademark examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments in support of registration, she finds them unpersuasive for the following reasons:

 

As noted previously, Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the services, and similarity of trade channels of the services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b).  The services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Applicant’s mark, “BTN,” is highly similar to the registrant’s mark, “BTN ACCESS,” in appearance, sound and commercial impression.  IN fact, the only thing distinguishing the marks is that registrant’s mark adds the additional descriptive term “ACCESS,” which registrant has disclaimed.  However, the dominant portion of registrant’s mark, “BTN,” is identical to applicant’s full mark.

 

Although the marks are compared in their entireties under a Trademark Act Section 2(d) analysis, one feature of a mark, here the term “BTN,” may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Applicant’s assertions that the differences between the two marks are “of major import” and that the dominant term of the registrant’s mark is “ACCESS” are unconvincing.  It is clear the term “ACCESS” is merely descriptive of a feature of registrant’s business services because they are available to consumers via the Internet. The term “access” is defined as “to obtain access to, especially by computer.”  Accordingly, registrant has disclaimed the term “ACCESS” apart from its mark.  Although a disclaimed portion of a mark certainly cannot be ignored, and the marks must be compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1060, 224 USPQ 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

In effect, applicant has merely deleted descriptive wording from an already registered mark.  The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Optical Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(b)(iii).  Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

 

Consumers who are familiar with registrant’s mark “BTN ACCESS” are likely to assume that applicant’s mark “BTN” simply represent new or special services offered from the registrant.  In re Compania Pesquera Vikingos de Colombia, S.A., 221 USPQ 556 (TTAB 1984).

 

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the services they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, the recollection of the average consumer upon seeing both marks would be the distinctive acronym “BTN,” thus making the marks confusing similar in the minds of the purchasing public.

Comparison of the Services

 

Despite applicant having amended its services, the respective services still remain very closely related.  The applicant’s amended services are “on-line business services, namely, on-line business targeting and marketing services.”  The registrant’s services include a number of advertising services, notably: “advertising agency services in the field of advertising and promotion,” and “dissemination of advertising materials, updating of advertising materials, compilation of advertisements for use as web pages on the Internet.”  These services are closely related in that they all comprise advertising or marketing services.  Applicant’s assertion that the registrant’s services are “so diverse as to be incomprehensible” is simply inapposite.

 

Furthermore, nothing in the registrant’s broadly worded identification of services would preclude it from offering its advertising services online, like applicant.  A determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is made solely on the basis of the services identified in the application and registration, without limitations or restrictions that are not reflected therein.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  If the cited registration describes the services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, then it is presumed that the registration encompasses all services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Moreover, these types of services are commonly provided together by a single source, and would be encountered by consumers in the same channels of trade.  In support of this, please find attached copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the services listed therein, namely on-line marketing services and advertising services of all varieties are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Since the marks are so highly similar and the services are so closely related, there is a likelihood that purchasers would confuse the sources of the services or believe they stemmed from a single source.  Accordingly, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act due to a likelihood of confusion is proper, and is thus maintained and is now made final.

 

Identification of Services—FINAL

 

THIS REQUIREMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THE SERVICES “BUSINESS TARGETING” SPECIFIED THEREIN:

 

The amended wording “business targeting” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because it is unclear as to the exact nature of the services.  See TMEP §1402.01.  For instance, this wording could describe targeting businesses for providing any number of services, such as advertising, business consultation or management.

 

Applicant must amend the wording to specify the common commercial or generic name for the services.  If the services have no common commercial or generic name, applicant must describe the nature of the services as well as their main purpose, channels of trade, and the intended consumer(s).  TMEP §1402.01.

 

The examining attorney suggests, and applicant may adopt, any or all of the following identification of services, if accurate:

 

“On-line business services, namely, on-line targeted marketing services,” in International Class 35.

 

TMEP §1402.01.

 

Identifications of services can be amended only to clarify or limit the services; adding to or broadening the scope of the services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include services that are not within the scope of the services set forth in the present identification.

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the online searchable Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

Accordingly, the requirement that applicant provide an acceptable identification of services is maintained and is now made final.

 

Response Guidelines

If applicant does not respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

 

(1)  Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)  Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

 

 

 

/Allison P. Schrody/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 115

(571) 272-5893

(571) 273-9115 (fax)

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail.  For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney.  Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.