Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

PLEASE NOTE: THIS IS A CORRECTIVE OFFICE ACTION.  PLEASE DISREGARD THE PREVIOUS OFFICE ACTION SENT, AS IT DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES.

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62, 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL- LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2132111 (iTV).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark iTV is identical to the literal portion of registrant’s mark iTV.  The fact that the registrant’s mark is a design which shows the letter “i” in between the letters “T” and “V” is not signification because consumers would likely read the mark as iTV not TiV because the letter “i” appears larger and more dominant.  The fact that registrant’s mark has a design element of the letters enclosed in a shaded circle is also not significant when comparing the two marks.  When a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods and/or services.  Therefore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight in determining likelihood of confusion.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc., 192 USPQ 729, 735 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Overall, the marks have the same commercial impression. 

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS/SERVICES

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

Applicant’s “portable, handheld cellular television receiving devices” are related to the registrant’s “interactive television transmission services” because television equipment and services are frequently sold by the same outlets.  Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding BIGG’S for retail grocery and general merchandise store services likely to be confused with BIGGS for furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (holding design for distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids likely to be confused with design for skin cream).  Accordingly, the goods/services would likely be sold to the same class of purchasers and encountered under circumstances leading one to mistakenly believe the goods/services originate from the same source. 

 

Attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely televisions receivers and television transmission services are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

See U.S. Registrations Nos. 2715585; 3007648; 3275984; and 3440594. 

 

Since the marks are similar and the goods/services are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of applicant’s goods.  Therefore, applicant’s mark is not entitled to registration. 

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL- MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes characteristics of applicant’s goods and/or services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

Applicant’s mark “iTV” is descriptive for applicant’s services “portable, handheld cellular television receiving devices.”  The letter “i” or “I” used as a prefix would be understood by the purchasing public to refer to the Internet when used in relation to Internet-related products or services.  Therefore, when this prefix is coupled with a descriptive word or term for Internet-related goods and/or services, then the entire mark is merely descriptive under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).  See In re Zanova, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1300, 1304 (TTAB 2000) (holding ITOOL merely descriptive of computer software for use in creating web pages, and custom designing websites for others); TMEP §1209.03(d).  The term “TV” is descriptive of applicant’s goods because “TV” is an abbreviation for the term “television.”  Please see the attached dictionary definition.  Therefore the mark “iTV” is merely descriptive for a television that uses the Internet in some capacity. 

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the specified goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217-18, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  Moreover, a mark that identifies a group of users to whom an applicant directs its goods and/or services is also merely descriptive.  TMEP §1209.03(i); see In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1454 (TTAB 2004).

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system).  “Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

“A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.”  In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b).  It is enough if the term describes only one significant function, attribute or property.  In re Oppedahl, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371; TMEP §1209.01(b).

 

A term is merely descriptive if it conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the identified goods and/or services.  See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

 

The applicant’s mark “iTV” is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods.  For the aforementioned reasons, the mark is refused registration under Section 2(e)(1). 

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Additionally, applicant must respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

REQUEST FOR MORE INFORMATION

 

Applicant must submit more information regarding the goods to permit proper examination of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e).  Specifically applicant must indicate whether the goods use the Internet in any capacity. 

 

Failure to respond to a request for information can be grounds for refusing registration.  TMEP §814; see In re DTI P’ship LLP, 67 USPQ2d 1699, 1701-02 (TTAB 2003).  Merely stating that information about the goods or services is available on applicant’s website is an inappropriate response to a request for additional information, and is insufficient to make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004). 

STANDARD CHARACTER CLAIM REQUIRED

Applicant must submit the following standard character claim:  “The mark consists of standard characters without claim to any particular font, style, size, or color.”  See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §807.03(a).

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “receiving devices” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified.  See TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant must specify the common commercial or generic name for the goods. 

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:

 

Class 9: “portable, handheld cellular television receivers” 

 

Although identifications of goods may be amended to clarify or limit the goods, adding to or broadening the scope of the goods is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include goods that are not within the scope of the goods set forth in the present identification.

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the online searchable Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.  See TMEP §1402.04.

If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney.

 

/Courtney McCormick/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

Office: (571) 272-2907

Fax: (571) 273-9108

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office action should be filed using the form available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via e-mail, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.