Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 30th, 2008.  The applicant (1) argued against the refusal under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, (2) amended the identification of goods and (3) provided a standard character claim.  Only No. 3 is fully acceptable.

 

2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion – Final Action

 

Registration of the applied-for mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3,164,025.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark consists of the wording “NOTHING”.  The registrant’s mark consists of the wording “NOTHING” in stylized form.  The marks have the identical spelling, pronunciation and commercial connotation.

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant argues that there is no similarity in the marks because the applicant’s mark is in standard character form and the registrant’s mark is in stylized form, containing a large letter “O” within the term “NOTHING”.  The examiner is not persuaded by this argument.  The fact remains that both marks comprise the identical term: “NOTHING”.  The spelling is identical, the pronunciation is identical and the meaning of the terms is identical.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element itself and not in any particular display.  TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii); see 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters or otherwise in special form will not generally avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1387-88 (TTAB 1991); In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2015 (TTAB 1988).

 

When a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods and/or services.  Therefore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight in determining likelihood of confusion.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc., 192 USPQ 729, 735 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

Consumers will still refer to both the applicant’s goods and the registrant’s goods as “NOTHING” and will hear that term in connection with the goods regardless of the large letter “O” in the registrant’s mark.  At the very least, the marks are identical in sound, which is sufficient for a refusal under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

The applicant’s goods are identified as “video and computer game programs, game cartridges, game controllers, interactive tools and other game accessories; cd-roms, and other computer readable storage medium, all for use with personal video game counsels, computers and arcade machines; literature and instructional materials sold therewith; and downloadable video and computer game software” in Class 9 and “action skill games, equipment sold as unit for playing dancing games, hand-held unit for playing electronic games, hand-held unit for playing video games, equipment sold as a unit for electronic games other than those adapted for use with television receivers only and which use hands-free or contact-free controllers” in Class 28.  The registrant’s goods are identified as “board games” in Class 28.

 

The applicant argues there is no likelihood of confusion because the goods are “widely divergent”.  It is well established that the fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those goods.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01.

The goods consist of toys in the nature of board games, computer games and electronic games.  While the applicant’s goods are more technology based than the registrant’s board games, such items still travel in the identical channels of trade and target the same consumers: people who want to play games.  There is no age limit or any other limitations noted in the identifications.  As such, the examiner must conclude that the goods are like those found in any toy and game section of retail stores.

 

Many classic board games are now available in electronic forms as well as on computer software or DVDs.  The examining attorney conducted an online search via the search engine Google® on August 21, 2008 and found many such games including Scrabble®, Boggle®, Battleship® and Uno®.  See attachments “scrabble,” “boggle”, “battle1-2” and “uno1-2”. 

 

Further, attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely board games, game software, and electronic games, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

The marks are similar in sound, appearance and connotation.  The goods of the parties are related because the evidence clearly shows that board games are now often available in electronic forms and are produced by the same manufacturers.  Moreover, the goods travel in the identical trade channels and target the same consumers leading to the erroneous conclusion that the goods emanate from the same source.  For the reasons cited, the examiner finds there is a likelihood of confusion and the refusal to registration under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

Requirement for Definite Identification – Final Action

The identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because the nature of some of the goods in Class 9 is unclear.  See TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate: 

 

Class 9:

 

video and computer game programs, game cartridges, and game controllers; interactive tools and other game accessories, namely, [specify items by common commercial name e.g. joysticks, control floor pads or mats etc.]; pre-recorded cd-roms, DVDs, video cassettes, videotapes, and digital discs all featuring games for use with personal video game consoles and computers and accompanying literature and instructional materials sold therewith; downloadable video and computer game software.

 

Class 28:

 

action skill games, equipment sold as unit for playing dancing games, hand-held unit for playing electronic games, hand-held unit for playing video games, equipment sold as a unit for electronic games other than those adapted for use with television receivers only and which use hands-free or contact-free controllers; arcade games.

 

Identifications of goods can be amended only to clarify or limit the goods; adding to or broadening the scope of the goods is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include goods that are not within the scope of the goods set forth in the present identification.

Options

 

If applicant does not respond within six months of the mailing date of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by: 

 

(1)     Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)     Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

/Karen Bracey/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 116

571-272-9132

 

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail.  For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney.  Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.