Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on August 25, 2008. 

 

REFUSAL BASED ON LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 3148325.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

 

GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN DETERMINING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark VIEW2 and the registrant’s stylized mark VIEW² create the same commercial impression because they both contain the term “view” and “2” and are identical in sound, appearance and meaning. 

 

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant argues “VIEW² is not a fanciful term.  It clearly describes the characteristics of the product of the registrant.  It is also not a suggestive term. . . Virtually nobody requires any thought whatsoever to ascertain what a “VIEW²” is used for.  It is therefore not a suggestive term.”  Response 2.  The applicant further argues, “As we compare the entireties of Applicant’s VIEW2 and Registrant’s VIEW² it is evident that Registrant’s mark means the Descriptive term VIEW squared.  Said another way, it means VIEW multiplied times VIEW.  Applicant’s mark on the other hand contains no superscript and no space and thus is a character string that is not even a word in English or any other known language.  Thus “VIEW2” is either suggestive or fanciful in connection to applicant’s goods.”  The applicant provides absolutely no evidence to support it position and the examining attorney respectfully disagrees with the applicant’s unsupported conclusions. 

 

 There is no correct pronunciation of a trademark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark.  In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 USPQ 483, 484 (TTAB 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv); see In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec. Assoc., 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983).  The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  See RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469, 471 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services.  This protection extends to marks registered on the Supplemental Register.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see, e.g., In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 18 USPQ 337 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Hunke & Jochheim, 185 USPQ 188 (TTAB 1975).  Therefore, even if the applicant’s arguments that VIEW² is somehow descriptive while VIEW2 is fanciful were persuasive, the marks as a whole still create the same commercial impression, could be pronounced the same and applicant’s use of such a highly similar mark to the Registrant’s would lead to consumer confusion.

 

 

COMPARISON OF GOODS

 

Applicant’s “video monitors” are related to registrant’s “Computer workstations comprising keyboards, mouse, memory and storage devices, namely blank hard disks, blank tapes, blank floppy disks, blank CD-ROMS, and blank DVDs; video display cards, sound cards, hard drives for computers, floppy drives for computers, DVD rom, namely, blank DVD-ROMS for sound and video playing and recording, DVD-ROM writers, and DVD-ROM drives; DVD burner, CD burner, computer monitors, computer peripherals, motherboard, central processing units, computer disk drives, operating system software, and instructional manuals sold as a unit therewith; projectors, namely, video projectors, slide projectors, picture projectors, movie projectors; and television sets”  because the goods are sold in same channels of trade and to the same consumer. 

 

The third party registrations previously made of record show that the goods are the kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

“Applicant contends that its describes goods “Video Monitors” are not the same as Registrant’s description of goods.  Applicant contends that its goods and Registrant’s goods are not sold through the same marketing channels.”  Again the applicant provides absolutely no evidence to support its conclusion, and the examining attorney is not persuaded. 

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

In view of the foregoing, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made final. 

 

 

PROPER RESPONSE TO FINAL

 

If applicant does not respond within six months of the mailing date of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by: 

 

(1)     Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)     Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

 

/Jennifer M. Martin/

Examining Attorney, L.O. 116

(571) 272-9193; (571) 273-9116 (fax)

Jennifer.Martin@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail.  For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney.  Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.

 

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response.  Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

 

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.  When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.