Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  76/658744

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION

 

Introduction

 

This letter responds to the applicant’s communication filed on 3/22/07.

 

The amended recitation of services is accepted.

 

Final Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2932026 as to be likely, when used in connection with the identified goods/services, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

The examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).  TMEP §§1207.01(b) et seq. 

 

When the applicant’s mark is compared to a registered mark, “the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference.”  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956).  TMEP §1207.01(b). 

 

The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side‑by‑side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).

 

The marks (RMC) are identical.

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).  Such is the case here.

 

The goods/services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods/services come from a common source.  In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).  TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The applicant’s services are “Tracking and monitoring medical and legal insurance compliance; Coding compliance and information management for patient and client billing for hospitals, medical offices and law firms” in Class 35.  The registrant’s services are “Educational services, namely classes, course and educational testing in the field of medical coding” in Class 41.  It appears based on the applicant’s response that the registrant provides educational services to those who use the applicant’s services.  In this way, the services would be complimentary – used by the same parties and encountered in the same channels of trade in the field of medical coding.

 

In any event, the applicant’s web site (copy attached) clearly indicates that part of the applicant’s services include educational services for medical, legal and hospital staff members in the field of medical coding.  Thus, consumers would expect these services to emanate from the same sources and those familiar with the applicant’s Class 35 medical coding services would, upon seeing the registrant’s mark, mistakenly believe that the services come from the same source.

 

Applicant’s claim of priority of use is not relevant to this ex parte proceeding.  In re Calgon Corp, 435 F.2d 596, 168 USPQ 278 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate.  During ex parte prosecution, the trademark examining attorney has no authority to review or decide on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).

 

For these reasons, the refusal is repeated and made FINAL.

 

Response

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

 

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

 

 

/Howard B. Levine/

Howard B. Levine

Examining Attorney

Law Office 115

(571) 272 -9188

 

 

 

NOTICE OF NEW PROCEDURE FOR E-MAILED OFFICE ACTIONS:  In late spring 2007, for any applicant who authorizes e-mail communication with the USPTO, the USPTO will no longer directly e-mail the actual Office action to the applicant.  Instead, upon issuance of an Office action, the USPTO will e-mail the applicant a notice with a link/web address to access the Office action using Trademark Document Retrieval (TDR), which is located on the USPTO website at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.  The Office action will not be attached to the e-mail notice.  Upon receipt of the notice, the applicant can then view and print the actual Office action and any evidentiary attachments using the provided link/web address.  TDR is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, including holidays and weekends.  This new process is intended to eliminate problems associated with e-mailed Office actions that contain numerous attachments.

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.