Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  76/658328

 

The assigned trademark examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and has determined the following:

 

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3080867 and 3083847.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Taking into account the relevant Du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Applicant seeks to register the mark WAVETRAC for “Exercise equipment; namely, rowing exercising machine, chest expander, arm-exercising machine, sit-up exercising machine, weight-bearing machine, stationary exercise bicycles with and without upper body exercise attachments, running machine, pull-up exercising machine, abdominal exercising machine, thigh-exercising machine, waist-exercising machine, stationary riding exercise machine, treadmill, climbing exercising machine, skateboard-like exerciser.”  Registrant owns the marks WAVE and THE WAVE, both for “wheeled skateboard-like device.” 

 

Comparison of Marks

 

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The marks are compared in their entireties under a Section 2(d) analysis.  Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii).

 

The dominant element of U.S. Reg. No.  3080867 is the term WAVE, as the term makes up the entirety of the mark.  The dominant element of U.S. Reg. No.  3083847 is also the term WAVE, as the definite article THE has little trademark significance. 

 

With respect to the dominant element of applicant’s mark, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has held that the first word, prefix, or syllable in a mark is typically the dominant portion.  Presto Products v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 1998).  With respect to the first word, prefix, or syllable of a mark, the TTAB stated:

 

“[i]t is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered when making purchasing decisions.”  Id. at 1897. 

 

Therefore, WAVE is the dominant element of applicant’s mark.  As such, the dominant element of applicant’s mark is identical to the dominant element or entirety of registrant’s marks.  

 

Further, the mere addition of a term to a registered mark does not obviate the similarity between the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  In re Chatam International Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“GASPAR’S ALE and “JOSE GASPAR GOLD”); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“BENGAL” and “BENGAL LANCER”); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“THE LILLY” and “LILLI ANN”); In re El Torito Rests. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (“MACHO” and “MACHO COMBOS”); In re United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (“CAREER IMAGE” and “CREST CAREER IMAGES”); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (“CONFIRM” and “CONFIRMCELLS”); In re Riddle, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) (“ACCUTUNE” and “RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE”); In re Cosvetic Laboratories, Inc., 202 USPQ 842 (TTAB 1979) (“HEAD START” and “HEAD START COSVETIC”); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).

 

Therefore, as the dominant elements of the marks are identical, and applicant’s addition of the term TRAC does not obviate a likelihood of confusion, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Comparison of Goods

 

The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

A determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is made solely on the basis of the goods and/or services identified in the application and registration, without limitations or restrictions that are not reflected therein.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595 (TTAB 1999).  If the cited registration describes the goods and/or services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, then it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716 (TTAB 1992); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  Similarly, if the application describes the goods/services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods/services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii). 

 

Applicant’s “skateboard-like exerciser” is similar in nature and function to registrant’s goods, “wheeled skateboard-like device[s]” as the goods are intended to have skateboard qualities, without actually being a skateboard.  Further, the description of applicant’s goods, a “skateboard-like exerciser” is written broadly enough to encompass registrant’s more specifically delineated goods, “wheeled skateboard-like device[s].”  Therefore, the goods are closely related under a likelihood of confusion analysis. 

 

With respect to the remainder of applicant’s exercise goods, these goods are also closely related to registrant’s “wheeled skateboard-like device.”  Consumers are accustomed to seeing exercise equipment and skateboards being manufactured by the same commercial entity.  Attached are copies of fifteen (15) printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods listed therein, namely exercise equipment and skateboards, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).

 

If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); ECI Division of E-Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In closing, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).  Accordingly, confusion is likely and registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. 

 

Although the trademark examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

If the applicant has any questions or needs further assistance, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

/Daniel J. Russell/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 105

Phone No. (571) 272-8479

Fax No. (571) 273-8479

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.