UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  76/654354

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION

 

This letter responds to the applicant’s communication filed on January 31, 2007. The applicant argued against the refusal to register the mark under Section 2(d).

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No 2729278.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

 

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2729278 as to be likely, when used in connection with the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

The trademark examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive. For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

The applicant applied to register SNIPER for “motorcycles.” The registered mark is SNIPER for “bicycles.”

 

Comparison of the Marks

Regarding the first prong of the test, the marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).Here, the marks are identical in sound, appearance and meaning.

Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b). Considering the above, the marks of both parties are sufficiently similar to cause a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

Comparison of the Goods

Turning to the second prong, the goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Here, the applicant is providing motorcycles while the registrant provides bicycles. While these goods are not identical or directly competitive, they are related and would be encountered by consumers under such circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.

As Exhibits A through D show, motorcycles and bicycles are sold in the same channels of trade. Registrant’s identification of goods is the broad term “bicycles” which encompasses motorized bikes and dirt bikes, which are sold in the same channels of trade as motorcycles. The evidence also shows that such goods are produced by the same entities. See the attached evidence from various websites. Applicant’s attorney argues that applicant’s goods are sold through very narrow channels of trade, namely, applicant’s single location in Texas. However, applicant has identified the goods using the broad language “motorcycles.” Therefore, the trademark examining attorney must consider that motorcycles are sold through wider channels of trade and the registration of applicant’s mark would allow the applicant to sell its goods in the normal channels of trade in which motorcycles are sold, whether that it is their current intention or not.

Attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods listed therein, namely motorcycles and bicycles, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  See In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-1218 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).

Applicant’s attorney argues that the relevant purchasers of applicant’s goods are sophisticated consumers who have always performed extensive research into their purchase before finalizing a deal. However, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii). Where the relevant consumer is comprised of both sophisticated consumers and the general public, the standard of care when purchasing the goods is equal to that of the least sophisticated purchaser in the class.  Alfacell Corp. v. Anticancer Inc., 71 USPQ2d 1301, 1304 (TTAB 2004) (as stated in KOS Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 70 USPQ2d 1874 (3d Cir. 2004), and citing Checkpoint Sys., Inc., v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 285, 60 USPQ2d 1609, 1617-1618 (3d Cir. 2001)).

Conclusion

If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a). Here, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are identical. Thus, the relationship between applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods do not need to be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. Applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are produced by the same entities and sold in the same channels of trade.

 

Furthermore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

 

 

 

Therefore, with the contemporaneous use of identical marks, consumers are likely to reach the conclusion that the goods are related and emanate from a common source. Thus, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d). This refusal is now made FINAL.

 

Response Guidelines

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

 

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

If applicant has questions about its application, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.

 

/Seth A. Rappaport/

Seth A. Rappaport

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 103

Phone: (571) 270-1508

Fax: (571) 270-2508

 

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.