Suspension Letter

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

Serial Number   76/639640      

 

NOTICE OF SUSPENSION

 

SUSPENSION PROCEDURE:  This suspension notice serves to suspend action on the application for the reason(s) specified below.  No response is needed.  37 C.F.R. §2.67.  However, the examining attorney will conduct periodic status checks and may issue inquiries at 6 month intervals from the mailing date of this notice.  TMEP §716.05.  If a status inquiry Office action issues, applicant will have 6 months from the mailing or e-mailing date of the status inquiry to respond.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.62.

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Action on this application is suspended pending the disposition of:

 

            - Application Serial No(s). 76417618 and 78481125

 

Since applicant's effective filing date is subsequent to the effective filing date of the above-identified application(s), the latter, if and when it registers, may be cited against this application in a refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  A copy of information relevant to this pending application(s) was sent previously.

 

Applicant may submit a request to remove the application from suspension to present arguments related to the potential conflict between the relevant application(s) or other arguments related to the ground for suspension.  TMEP §716.03.  Applicant's election not to present arguments during suspension will not affect the applicant's right to present arguments later should a refusal in fact issue.  If a refusal does issue, applicant will be afforded 6 months from the mailing or e-mailing date of the Office action to submit a response.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.62.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – Continued.

The examiner considered the applicant’s arguments and was not persuaded to withdraw the Section 2(d) refusal

 

When applicant’s mark is compared to a registered mark, “the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference.”  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 40, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (internal citation omitted).

 

Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The test under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  It is unnecessary to show actual confusion in establishing likelihood of confusion.  See Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and cases cited therein.  See also In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025 (TTAB 1984), wherein the Board stated as follows:

 

[A]pplicant’s assertion that it is unaware of any actual confusion occurring as a result of the contemporaneous use of the marks of applicant and registrant is of little probative value in an ex parte proceeding such as this where we have no evidence pertaining to the nature and extent of the use by applicant and registrant (and thus cannot ascertain whether there has been ample opportunity for confusion to arise, if it were going to); and registrant has no chance to be heard (at least in the absence of a consent agreement, which applicant has not submitted in this case).  Id. at 1026-1027.

 

The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii).

 

 

 

/tmg/

Tonja M. Gaskins

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 112

(571) 272-9406