UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 76/617023
APPLICANT: Vanes, Michael
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RETURN ADDRESS: Commissioner for Trademarks P.O. Box 1451 Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
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MARK: 5.0
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: 35908
CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: |
Please provide in all correspondence:
1. Filing date, serial number, mark and applicant's name. 2. Date of this Office Action. 3. Examining Attorney's name and Law Office number. 4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.
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MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION: If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.
Serial Number 76/617023
The examining attorney acknowledges the applicant’s response to the office action of May 20, 2005. The citizenship clarification is acceptable. However, the section 2(d) refusal must be maintained and made FINAL.
Likelihood of Confusion
The trademark attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the applicant's mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods, so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2612508 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. TMEP section 1207. See the enclosed registration.
The trademark attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion. First, the trademark attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Second, the trademark attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).
Here, as stated in the first office action, the marks at issue are highly similar as they are phonetically equivalent. Applicant argues that the marks are not similar because of the letter E after POINT and the fact that the registrant’s mark contains the letter O in place of a zero 0. However, the differences pointed out by the applicant are completely lost when the marks are spoken. Additionally, there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark. Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Tokeiten v. Scuotto, 228 USPQ 461 (TTAB 1985); In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 USPQ 483 (TTAB 1985); In re Teradata Corp., 223 USPQ 361, 362 (TTAB 1984); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Moreover, the goods are highly related and legally identical with respect to “t-shirts” “hats” and “sweatshirts.” Applicant argues that the goods are not related by limiting the channels of trade of the registration. However, a determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is made solely on the basis of the goods identified in the application and registration, without limitations or restrictions that are not reflected therein. In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595 (TTAB 1999). If the cited registration describes the goods broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, then it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers. In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716 (TTAB 1992); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii). Thus, the registration is not limited to clothing sold by musical artists despite applicant’s argument.
Applicant also argues that the purchasers are sophisticated. However, items of apparel are generally not sophisticated goods which require much contemplation and research before purchase. Additionally, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii).
Lastly, applicant argues that the cited registration should be cancelled because it is not in use. However, applicant’s argument that the registration owner of the cited mark has abandoned its trademark is information relevant to a formal cancellation proceeding and is not appropriate matter for ex parte examination. TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).
Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate. During ex parte prosecution, an applicant will not be heard on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration such as a registrant’s nonuse of the mark. See In re Dixie Restaurants, 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 168 USPQ 278 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Cosmetically Yours, Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 424 F.2d 1385, 1387, 165 USPQ 515, 517 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Peebles Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n. 5 (TTAB 1992); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534 (TTAB 1988); In re Pollio Dairy Products Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2014-15 (TTAB 1988).
The marks at issue are phonetically equivalent. The goods are legally identical with respect to certain items and otherwise related as they are common items of apparel. Thus, confusion is likely and registration must be refused.
If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond to this final action by:
(1) submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or
(2) filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).
In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2). 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters. The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
/Daniel Capshaw/
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 110
571.272.9356
HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:
STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.
VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm
FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.