Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  76/607031

 

This letter responds to the applicant's communication filed on August 23, 2005.

 

The standard character claim is acceptable.

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments regarding the likelihood of confusion carefully but found them unpersuasive.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

REGISTRATION REFUSED--LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION—FINAL

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2827598 as to be likely, when used on the identified services, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).  Second, the examining attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).

 

The applicant has applied to register the mark “MOTIVE” for clothing, namely, tops, bottoms, skirts, dresses, underwear, swimwear, headwear, footwear, belts and coats.  The registered mark is “MOTIV (& design)” for clothing, namely, shirts, shorts, bathing suits, beach wear, bikinis, sun-suits, snowboard boots, snowboard gloves, aprons, athletic footwear, gym shorts, gym suits, jeans, t-shirts, pants, leather jackets, skirts, socks, and underwear.

 

The examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).  In this case, the literal elements of the marks are similar in sound, appearance and commercial impression.  When a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods or services.  Therefore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight in determining likelihood of confusion.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc., 192 USPQ 729 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  The literal portions of both marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound and meaning.  The addition of the design element does not obviate the similarity between the marks in this case.  In re Shell Oil Company, 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Finally, it is well settled that if the goods of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods.  ECI Division of E Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980).  TMEP §1207.01(b).  As such, the applicant can clearly see that the marks are sufficiently similar to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

 

The goods are identical or closely related.   The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.  In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978). The decisions in the clothing field have held many different types of apparel to be related under Section 2(d).  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 286 F.2d 623, 128 USPQ 549 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (“WINTER CARNIVAL” for women’s boots v. men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233 (TTAB 1992) (“ELANCE” for underwear v. “ELAAN” for neckties); In re Melville Corp. 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991) (“ESSENTIALS” for women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets v. women’s shoes); In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (“NEWPORTS” for women’s shoes v. “NEWPORT” for outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397 (TTAB 1982) (“OMEGA” for hosiery v. trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444 (TTAB 1975) (“GRANADA” for men’s suits, coats, and trousers v. ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400 (TTAB 1964) (“SLEEX” for brassieres and girdles v. slacks for men and young men).

 

The applicant contends that there is no likelihood of confusion because the registrant’s clothing is “undoubtedly sold only in automobile dealerships, wheel rim/cover establishments and/or car accessory stores;” whereas the applicant’s goods are sold in “boutiques, retail stores and department stores.”   The examining attorney disagrees with the applicant’s contention.  The registrant’s identification of goods contains no restriction or limitation as to the location or channels of trade in which the clothing is sold.  It is well settled that the examining attorney must determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion on the basis of the goods identified in the application and registration.  If the cited registration describes the goods broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981).  Moreover, an applicant may not restrict the scope of the goods covered in the registration by extrinsic argument or evidence.  See, e.g., In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764 (TTAB 1986).  Therefore, for the purposes of a likelihood of confusion analysis in this case, it must be assumed that the goods are identical, travel in the same channels of trade, and are available to the same potential customers.  As such, the applicant can clearly see that the goods are sufficiently related to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

  

Finally, the applicant apparently suggests that there is no likelihood of confusion because the registrant’s primary goods are wheel rims and its use of the mark on clothing is “purely ornamental” and not used as “trademark” on or for clothing.  Such assertions by the applicant are in the nature of collateral attacks on the cited registration and are improper in an ex parte proceeding.  In fact, Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant's ownership of the mark and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate.  During ex parte prosecution, an applicant will not be heard on matters which constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration (e.g., a registrant's nonuse of the mark).  See In re Dixie Restaurants, 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cosmetically Yours, Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 424 F.2d 1385,1387, 165 USPQ 515, 517 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Pollio Dairy Products Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2014-15 (TTAB 1988). Accordingly, such arguments will not be considered by the examining attorney in this case.

 

For the foregoing reasons, the similarities between the marks and the goods are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion.  The examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).

 

Please note that the only appropriate responses to a final action are either (1) compliance with the outstanding requirements, if feasible, or (2) filing of an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  37 C.F.R. Section 2.64(a).  If the applicant fails to respond within six months of the mailing date of this refusal, this Office will declare the application abandoned.  37 C.F.R. Section 2.65(a).

 

 

Scott Baldwin /sb/

571-272-9398

LO: 112

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form (visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions, but if the Office Action has been issued via email, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office Action to respond via TEAS).
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above and include the serial number, law office number and examining attorney’s name in your response.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm