UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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SERIAL NO: 76/590945
APPLICANT: Cornell Research Foundation, Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
RETURN ADDRESS: Commissioner for Trademarks P.O. Box 1451 Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
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MARK: BLUSHINGGOLD
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: N/A
CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: |
Please provide in all correspondence:
1. Filing date, serial number, mark and applicant's name. 2. Date of this Office Action. 3. Examining Attorney's name and Law Office number. 4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.
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Serial Number 76/590945
The assigned examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and determined the following.
The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the applicant's mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods, so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2,187,530 as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. TMEP §1207. See the attached registration.
The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion. First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Second, the examining attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).
The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side‑by‑side comparison. The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the services come from a common source. In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).
The applicant's proposed mark is BLUSHINGGOLD for live cherry trees. The registrant's referenced mark is BLUSHINGSTAR for live peach trees. The respective marks are comprised in either whole or significant part of the term BLUSHING. Such a term is arbitrary and distinctive as used in connection with the identified goods. Although the applicant’s mark contains the term “gold” and the registrant’s mark contains the term “star,” these terms do not create entirely different commercial impressions. Moreover, purchasers are likely to believe that each mark may be a variation of the other. Consequently, the marks are likely to cause confusion in the marketplace.
Because the respective marks are similar, the only issue before the examining attorney is whether the applicant's goods are so related to the registrant's goods that confusion as to source of origin or sponsorship is likely to occur. The examining attorney must conclude that they are so related, for it is foreseeable that customers of the applicant might encounter the registrant's respective goods and mark in the marketplace given the similar channel of trade within which the identified goods travel.
Confusion as to source of origin or sponsorship is extremely likely if the applicant's proposed mark is allowed to register. Therefore, registration is refused. Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
If the applicant responds to the above refusal, then the applicant must address the following issues.
The applicant must submit the following standard character claim: “The mark is presented in standard characters without claim to any particular font style, size, or color.” 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a).
Date of First Use in Commerce is Earlier than Date of First Use Anywhere
The applicant has specified a date of first use of the mark in commerce that is earlier than the date of first use anywhere. This is not possible because use in commerce by definition includes use anywhere. TMEP §903.04. Therefore, the applicant must amend the dates‑of‑use clause to specify a date of first use anywhere that is not later than the date of first use in commerce. The applicant must verify this amendment with an affidavit or a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20. 37 C.F.R. §2.71(c); TMEP §§903.04 and 903.05.
Declaration with Averments
The undersigned, being hereby warned that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under 18 U.S.C. §1001, and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any resulting registration, declares that he/she is properly authorized to execute this application on behalf of the applicant; he/she believes the applicant to be the owner of the trademark/service mark sought to be registered, to the best of his/her knowledge and belief no other person, firm, corporation, or association has the right to use the mark in commerce, either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods/services of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; and that all statements made of his/her own knowledge are true and all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true.
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(Signature)
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(Print or Type Name and Position)
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(Date)
NOTICE: TRADEMARK OPERATION RELOCATION
The Trademark Operation has relocated to Alexandria, Virginia. Effective October 4, 2004, all Trademark-related paper mail (except documents sent to the Assignment Services Division for recordation, certain documents filed under the Madrid Protocol, and requests for copies of trademark documents) must be sent to:
Commissioner for Trademarks
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
Applicants, attorneys and other Trademark customers are strongly encouraged to correspond with the USPTO online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.
/Christopher L. Buongiorno/
Law Office 102
(571) 272-9251.
How to respond to this Office Action:
You may respond formally using the Office's Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form (visit http://eteas.gov.uspto.report/V2.0/oa242/WIZARD.htm and follow the instructions therein, but you must wait until at least 72 hours after receipt if the office action issued via e-mail). PLEASE NOTE: Responses to Office Actions on applications filed under the Madrid Protocol (Section 66(a)) CANNOT currently be filed via TEAS.
To respond formally via regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing Return Address listed above and include the serial number, law office and examining attorney’s name on the upper right corner of each page of your response.
FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY.