Offc Action Outgoing

FCR FIRST CAPITAL REALTY ONE

WONG, EDMUND

Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

    SERIAL NO: 76/533511

 

    APPLICANT:                          WONG, EDMUND

 

 

        

*76533511*

    CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

    CHRISTOPHER J DAY

    340 EAST PALM LANE SUITE 282

    PHOENIX AZ 85004

   

   

RETURN ADDRESS: 

Commissioner for Trademarks

2900 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202-3514

 

 

 

 

    MARK:          FCR FIRST CAPITAL REALTY ONE

 

 

 

    CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:   N/A

 

    CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: 

 

Please provide in all correspondence:

 

1.  Filing date, serial number, mark and

     applicant's name.

2.  Date of this Office Action.

3.  Examining Attorney's name and

     Law Office number.

4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, WE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF OUR MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  76/533511

 

This letter responds to the applicant’s communication filed on July 8, 2004.  The amended recitation of services and disclaimer have been entered into the record and are acceptable.  The Section 2(d) refusal citing Registration Nos. 2729052 [FCR] and 2327993 [FIRST REALTY and design] are withdrawn.

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the marks shown in U.S. Registration Nos.   2546050 [CAPITAL FIRST REALTY] and 1406101 [1 REALTY ONE and design] as to be likely, when used on the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) based on Registration Nos. 2546050 and 1406101 is maintained and made FINAL

 

Section 2(d) Final Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).  Second, the examining attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).

 

a.  The First Cited Mark

The examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).

 

The applicant’s mark FIRST CAPITAL REALTY ONE FCR and design for “REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT AND BROKERAGE SERVICES” in International Class 36. 

 

The first cited registered mark is CAPITAL FIRST REALTY (typed) for “management of real estate” in International Class 36.  Consumer confusion as to source is likely when these marks are used on related goods and services because the marks are similar and the applicant has merely reversed the terms FIRST CAPITAL and CAPITAL FIRST.   The applicant’s mark is essentially a transposition of the registrant’s mark.  Such a transposition does not create a different overall commercial impression that would negate the likelihood of confusion.  In re Wine Society of America Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1139 (TTAB 1989); In re Nationwide Industries Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1882 (TTAB 1988); In re General Tire & Rubber Co., 213 USPQ 870 (TTAB 1982).  TMEP §1207.01(b)(vii). 

 

In addition, the applicant has merely added terms to the registered mark, namely, ONE FCR and design.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance despite the addition, deletion or substitution of letters or words.  See, e.g., Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates, Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (TMM held confusingly similar to TMS, both for systems software); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, N.A., v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH held likely to be confused with COMMUNICASH, both for banking services); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041 (TTAB 1987) (TRUCOOL for synthetic coolant held likely to be confused with TURCOOL for cutting oil); In re Curtice-Burns, Inc., 231 USPQ 990 (TTAB 1986) (MCKENZIE’S (stylized) for processed frozen fruits and vegetables held likely to be confused with McKenzie for canned fruits and vegetables); In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (NEWPORTS for women’s shoes held likely to be confused with NEWPORT for outer shirts); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON for microprocessor used in commercial laundry machines held likely to be confused with MILLTRONICS (stylized) for electronic control devices for machinery); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL for resinous chemicals used in dyeing textiles held likely to be confused with LUTEX for non-resinous chemicals used in the textile industry).

 

When the applicant's mark is compared to a registered mark, "the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference."  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956).

 

The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side‑by‑side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP section 1207.01(b).

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, the examining attorney must consider the commercial relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties carefully to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Concordia International Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355 (TTAB 1983).

 

b.  The Services

The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.  In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).  In this case the services are exactly the same as to “real estate management.”

 

The examining attorney must consider any goods or services in the registrant's normal fields of expansion to determine whether the registrant's goods or services are related to the applicant's identified goods or services under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).

 

If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services.  ECI Division of E Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980).

 

c.     Channels of Trade

In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the examining attorney must consider all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods.  Industrial Nucleonic Corp. v. Hinde Engineering Co., 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (CCPA 1973).  These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and services.  In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  If the goods and services of the parties differ, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner.  In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).  In this case the channels of trade are the same as to real estate management.  In fact, many real estate management services are advertised on the World Wide Web, newspapers, and telephone books.  Therefore, use of very similar marks to identify the same services is likely to cause consumer confusion as to source.

 

a.  The Second Cited Mark

The examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).

 

The second cited registered mark is 1 REALTY ONE and design for “real estate agency and brokerage services” in International Class 36.  Consumer confusion as to source is likely when these marks are used on related goods and services because the marks are the same as to REALTY ONE.  The applicant has merely added the terms FIRST CAPITAL and the design.  The mere addition of a term to a registered mark is not sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  Coca‑Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“BENGAL” and “BENGAL LANCER”); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“THE LILLY” and “LILLI ANN”); In re El Torito Restaurants Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (“MACHO” and “MACHO COMBOS”); In re United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (“CAREER IMAGE” and “CREST CAREER IMAGES”); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (“CONFIRM” and “CONFIRMCELLS”); In re Riddle, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) (“ACCUTUNE” and “RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE”); In re Cosvetic Laboratories, Inc., 202 USPQ 842 (TTAB 1979) (“HEAD START” and “HEAD START COSVETIC”).  TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). 

 

When the applicant's mark is compared to a registered mark, "the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference."  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956).

 

The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side‑by‑side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP section 1207.01(b).

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, the examining attorney must consider the commercial relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties carefully to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Concordia International Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355 (TTAB 1983).

 

b.  The Services

The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.  In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).  In this case, the services are exactly the same as to real estate brokerage.

 

 

The examining attorney must consider any goods or services in the registrant's normal fields of expansion to determine whether the registrant's goods or services are related to the applicant's identified goods or services under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).

 

If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services.  ECI Division of E Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980).

 

c.  Channels of Trade

In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the examining attorney must consider all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods.  Industrial Nucleonic Corp. v. Hinde Engineering Co., 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (CCPA 1973).  These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods and services.  In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  If the goods and services of the parties differ, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner.  In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).  The channels of trade are the same because the services are exactly the same. See the attached printouts illustrating that real estate brokerage services can be found by conducting a broad search on the World Web Web. A search of these services is likely to retrieve both the applicant and registrant’s mark thereby causing confusion.  Therefore, use of similar marks that create the same commercial impression and that identify the exact same services is likely to cause consumer confusion as to source.

 

For these reasons, the refusal to register under Trademark Act Section 2(d), citing Registration Nos. 2546050 and 1406101 is continued and made FINAL.

 

Proper Response to Final Action

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); or

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matter.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

NOTICE:  TRADEMARK OPERATION RELOCATING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER  2004

 

The Trademark Operation is relocating to Alexandria, Virginia, in October and November 2004.  Effective October 4, 2004, all Trademark-related paper mail (except documents sent to the Assignment Services Division for recordation, certain documents filed under the Madrid Protocol, and requests for copies of trademark documents) must be sent to:

 

Commissioner for Trademarks

P.O. Box 1451

Alexandria, VA  22313-1451

 

Applicants, registration owners, attorneys and other Trademark customers are strongly encouraged to correspond with the USPTO online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), at www.uspto.gov.

 

To reach the undersigned attorney by telephone after November 2, 2004, please call (571) 272 - 9349.  Thank you.

 

 

/Mrs. A.D. Saunders/

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 108

703-308-9108 x229

703-746-8108

 

 

How to respond to this Office Action:

 

To respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions.

 

To respond formally via regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing Return Address listed above and include the serial number, law office and examining attorney’s name on the upper right corner of each page of your response.

 

To check the status of your application at any time, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/

 

For general and other useful information about trademarks, you are encouraged to visit the Office’s web site at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY.

 

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