UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, WE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF OUR MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  76/523350

 

This letter responds to the applicant’s communication filed on September 13, 2004.  The applicant (1) argued against the refusal to registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act and (2) provided a stippling statement.  Only No. 2 is fully acceptable.

 

Likelihood of Confusion Refusal – Final Action

 

Registration of the proposed mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2,544,942.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  Miss Universe, Inc. v. Miss Teen U.S.A., Inc., 209 USPQ 698 (N.D. Ga. 1980).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

 

The Trademark Act not only guards against the misimpression that the senior user is the source of the junior user’s goods or services, but it also protects against “reverse confusion,” that is, that the junior user is the source of the senior user’s goods or services.  Banff Ltd., v. Federated Department Stores, 6 USPQ2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1988); Fisons Horticulture v. Vigoror Industries, 31 USPQ2d 1592 (3d Cir. 1994).

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §§1207.01(b) et seq.

 

As noted, when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d), the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but rather whether the marks will confuse the people into believing that the goods they identify emanate from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant argues that there is not a likelihood of confusion because the applicant’s mark, consisting of the term “SCRUBS,” and the registrant’s mark, “SCRUB CLUB,” do not create the same commercial impression for two reasons.  First, because of the existence of third-party registrations that contain variations of the term “SCRUB” and because the applicant’s mark is a single term and design element, whereas the registrant’s mark consists of two terms.  The examining attorney is not persuaded by these arguments.  Moreover, the examining attorney objects to the reference of the third party registrations because are not in a proper form to be added to the record.  To make a third-party registration of record, a copy of the registration, either a copy of the paper USPTO record, or a copy taken from the electronic records of the Office, should be submitted.  Mere listings of registrations, or copies of private company search reports, are not sufficient to make the registrations of record.  TBMP Section 1208.02.  As to third party registrations in general, third-party registrations, by themselves, are entitled to little weight on the question of likelihood of confusion.  In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Hub Distributing, Inc., 218 USPQ 284 (TTAB 1983).  Third-party registrations are not evidence of what happens in the marketplace or that the public is familiar with the use of those marks.  In re Comexa Ltda, 60 USPQ2d 1118 (TTAB 2001); National Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Record Chem. Co., 185 USPQ 563 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Further, existence on the register of other confusingly similar marks would not assist applicant in registering yet another mark which so resembles the cited registered mark that confusion is likely.  In re Total Quality Group Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474 (TTAB 1999).

 

The applicant further argues that the marks in question are not similar because the existence of third-party registrations containing a form of the term “SCRUB” prevents consumers from forming a common commercial impression of the marks.  Additionally, the applicant argues that because the applicant’s mark is stylized and the registrant’s is typed or in standard character form, this weighs against a finding of similarity.  Registration of a mark in typed or standard character form means that the mark may be displayed in any lettering style.  37 C.F.R. §2.52(a).  The rights associated with a mark in typed or standard character form reside in the wording itself, and registrant is free to adopt any style of lettering, including lettering identical to that used by applicant.  Therefore, applicant’s presentation of its mark in special form will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark that is registered in typed or standard character form because the marks presumably could be used in the same manner of display.  See In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386 (TTAB 1991); In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012 (TTAB 1988); Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Sunex Int’l Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (TTAB 1987); In re Hester Indus., Inc., 231 USPQ 881, 882, n.6 (TTAB 1986); United Rum Merchants, Ltd. V. Fregal, Inc., 216 USPQ 217 (TTAB 1982); Frances Denney, Inc. v. Vive Parfums, Ltd., 190 USPQ 302 (TTAB 1976); See also TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).

 

Moreover, when a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods or services.  Therefore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight in determining likelihood of confusion.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc., 192 USPQ 729 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

Here, the common element to each mark is the term “SCRUB”.  The fact that the applicant uses it in plural form does not significantly alter the fact that the two terms are similar.  Given that more weight is generally placed upon wording instead of design elements, the examining attorney finds this to be a dominant element of the marks.  The marks are compared in their entireties under a Section 2(d) analysis.  Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii).

 

Comparison of the Services

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The applicant submitted evidence from the registrant’s website that shows how the registrant uses its mark in connection with its auto dealer services.  It is well settled, however, that likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods or services as they are identified in the application and the registration. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Paula Payne Products Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  The examining attorney focuses on the marks as they appear in the application and registration, and on the services as identified in the registration and application.

 

Here, the applicant’s services are identified as “Automobile cleaning, washing and polishing service.”  The registrant’s services are identified as “Car washing services.”  The services are legal equivalents.  If the goods or services of the respective parties are closely related, the degree of similarity between marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would apply with diverse goods or services.  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 23 USPQ2d 1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); ECI Division of E-Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1980); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The fact that the registrant might provide its services in connection with auto dealership or repair services does not obviate a finding of similarity because the services, as identified, do not restrict the channels of trade or indicate certain venues in which the services are rendered. As such, the examining attorney must conclude the services are found in the same or similar commercial settings and are available to similar consumers.

 

The marks are similar in sound, appearance and connotation.  The services provided by each party are identical.  As a result, the degree of similarity between the marks is not as strict as it would be with different goods and services.  For these reasons, the examining attorney finds there is a likelihood of confusion and the refusal to registration is maintained and made FINAL.

 

Options

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matter.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

NOTICE:  FEE CHANGE   

 

Effective January 31, 2005 and pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 108-447, the following are the fees that will be charged for filing a trademark application:

 

(1) $325 per international class if filed electronically using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS); or 

 

(2)   $375 per international class if filed on paper

 

These fees will be charged not only when a new application is filed, but also when payments are made to add classes to an existing application. If such payments are submitted with a TEAS response, the fee will be  $325 per class, and if such payments are made with a paper response, the fee will be $375 per class.

 

The new fee requirements will apply to any fees filed on or after January 31, 2005.

 

NOTICE:  TRADEMARK OPERATION RELOCATION

 

The Trademark Operation has relocated to Alexandria, Virginia.  Effective October 4, 2004, all Trademark-related paper mail (except documents sent to the Assignment Services Division for recordation, certain documents filed under the Madrid Protocol, and requests for copies of trademark documents) must be sent to:

 

Commissioner for Trademarks

P.O. Box 1451

Alexandria, VA  22313-1451

 

Applicants, attorneys and other Trademark customers are strongly encouraged to correspond with the USPTO online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.

 

If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

/Karen Bracey/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116

571-272-9132

571-273-9116 (fax)

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form (visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions, but if the Office Action issued via email you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office Action to respond via TEAS).
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above and include the serial number, law office number and examining attorney’s name in your response.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.