To: | Digitrax, Inc. (zana@digitrax.com) |
Subject: | TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 76455237 - SUPERSONIC - N/A |
Sent: | 3/6/03 12:18:43 PM |
Sent As: | ECom106 |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 76/455237
APPLICANT: Digitrax, Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: DIGITRAX, INC. 450 CEMETERY ST #206 NORCROSS GA 30071
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RETURN ADDRESS: Commissioner for Trademarks 2900 Crystal Drive Arlington, VA 22202-3513 ecom106@uspto.gov
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MARK: SUPERSONIC
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: N/A
CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS: zana@digitrax.com |
Please provide in all correspondence:
1. Filing date, serial number, mark and applicant's name. 2. Date of this Office Action. 3. Examining Attorney's name and Law Office number. 4. Your telephone number and e-mail address.
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Serial Number 76/455237
The assigned examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and determined the following.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION SECTION 2(d)
The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the applicant's mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods, so resembles the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2041229 and 2464695 as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. TMEP section 1207. See the enclosed registrations.
The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion. First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Second, the examining attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).
In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the examining attorney must consider all circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods. Industrial Nucleonic Corp. v. Hinde Engineering Co., 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (CCPA 1973). These circumstances include the marketing channels, the identity of the prospective purchasers and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods. In comparing the marks, similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. If the goods of the parties differ, it is necessary to show that they are related in some manner. In this case, both types of goods are toy vehicles of a kind and could be used together. In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977).
The test under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is whether there is a likelihood of confusion. It is unnecessary to show actual confusion in establishing likelihood of confusion. See Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and cases cited therein.
When the applicant's mark is compared to a registered mark, "the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference." Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956).
The examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
The applicant should also note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2 (E)(1)
The examining attorney refuses registration on the Principal Register because the proposed mark merely describes the goods. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1); TMEP section 1209 et seq.
A mark is merely descriptive under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1), if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the relevant goods. In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 229 USPQ 818 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re MetPath Inc., 223 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1984); In re Bright‑Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979); TMEP section 1209.01(b).
The examining attorney must consider whether a mark is merely descriptive in relation to the identified goods, not in the abstract. In re Omaha National Corp., 819 F.2d 1117, 2 USPQ2d 1859 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1978); In re Venture Lending Associates, 226 USPQ 285 (TTAB 1985).
It is not necessary that a term describe all of the purposes, functions, characteristics or features of the goods to be merely descriptive. It is enough if the term describes one attribute of the goods. In re H.U.D.D.L.E., 216 USPQ 358 (TTAB 1982); In re MBAssociates, 180 USPQ 338 (TTAB 1973).
In this case, the applicant’s specimens refer to “supersonic motor drive for quiet operation”, referencing the attached definition of supersonic, meaning “Of or relating to sound waves beyond human audibility.[1]
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER
Although the examining attorney has refused registration on the Principal Register, the applicant may amend the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. Trademark Act Section 23, 15 U.S.C. Section 1091; 37 C.F.R. Sections 2.47 and 2.75(a); TMEP sections 202.02(b) and 1115.
No set form is required for response to this Office action. The applicant must respond to each point raised. The applicant should simply set forth the required changes or statements and request that the Office enter them. The applicant must sign the response. In addition to the identifying information required at the beginning of this letter, the applicant should always provide a telephone number to speed up further processing.
/Linda E. B. Mickleburgh/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 106
703-308-9106 x222
linda.mickleburgh@uspto.gov
Fee increase effective January 1, 2003
Effective January 1, 2003, the fee for filing an application for trademark registration will be increased to $335.00 per International Class. The USPTO will not accord a filing date to applications that are filed on or after that date that are not accompanied by a minimum of $335.00.
Additionally, the fee for amending an existing application to add an additional class or classes of goods/services will be $335.00 per class for classes added on or after January 1, 2003.
How to respond to this Office Action:
To respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions.
To respond formally via E-mail, visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/web/trademarks/tmelecresp.htm and follow the instructions.
To respond formally via regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing Return Address listed above and include the serial number, law office and examining attorney’s name on the upper right corner of each page of your response.
FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY.
[1]The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition copyright © 1992 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation; further reproduction and distribution restricted in accordance with the Copyright Law of the United States. All rights reserved.