UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  76/377423

 

This letter responds to a timely suspension inquiry of the present application.

 

The Section 2(d) refusal based upon a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration Nos. 1,610,827, 1,841,001 and 1,887,341 and prior pending applications, Serial Nos. 75/889398, 75/889399 and 76/120778, have been withdrawn.

 

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

However, registration of the proposed mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1,872,983, 2,806,019 and 2,806,038.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

 

In the present case, the applicant seeks to register the mark JAKE’S for “restaurant franchising services.”  The three registrations are owned by two different owners, as follows: JAKE’S PIZZA for “restaurant and take out food services featuring pizza” and two marks of JAKE’S for “restaurant and bar services.”

 

Taking into account the relevant Du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  First, the marks are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Second, the goods or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or related or whether the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely.  In re National Novice Hockey League, Inc., 222 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1984); In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); Guardian Prods. Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of Marks

The marks are compared for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E .I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The marks are compared in their entireties under a Section 2(d) analysis.  Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii).  The word JAKE’S is the dominant word in each of the marks as the word PIZZA in one of the registrations is generic and therefore disclaimed.

 

Disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  Although a disclaimed portion of a mark certainly cannot be ignored, and the marks must be compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant in creating a commercial impression.  In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re National Data Corporation, 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); and In re Appetito Provisions Co. Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987).  See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ 2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re El Torito Rests. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988); In re Equitable Bancorporation, 229 USPQ 709 (TTAB 1986).

 

Consequently, there is no wording in the applicant’s mark to allow the general consumer to distinguish the marks.  Additionally, when applicant’s mark is compared to a registered mark, “the points of similarity are of greater importance than the points of difference.”  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ 517 (1956).

 

Comparison of Goods/Services

Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  See In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (BIGG’S for retail grocery and general merchandise store services held confusingly similar to BIGGS for furniture); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women’s clothing store services and clothing held likely to be confused with CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms); In re United Service Distributors, Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (design for distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids held likely to be confused with design for skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB for various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing held likely to be confused with THE “21” CLUB (stylized) for restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (STEELCARE INC. for refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery held likely to be confused with STEELCASE for office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (use of similar marks for trucking services and on motor trucks and busses is likely to cause confusion).

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source.  On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the present case, the applicant’s services are highly related to the restaurant services identified in the respective registrations.  A determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is made solely on the basis of the goods and/or services identified in the application and registration, without limitations or restrictions that are not reflected therein.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595 (TTAB 1999).  If the cited registration describes the goods and/or services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, then it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716 (TTAB 1992); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

The applicant’s services are very likely to be provided by restaurants.  Any goods or services in the registrant’s normal fields of expansion must also be considered in order to determine whether the registrant’s goods or services are related to the applicant’s identified goods or services for purposes of analysis under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).  The test is whether purchasers would believe the product or service is within the registrant’s logical zone of expansion.  CPG Prods. Corp. v. Perceptual Play, Inc., 221 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(a)(v).

 

The fact that the services of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular services, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and cases cited therein.  The examining attorney finds it to be extremely likely for a restaurant to expand to “restaurant franchising services.”

 

Accordingly, the mark is refused registration on the Principal Register under Section 2(d).

 

Response

If applicant has any non-substantive questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.

 

 

 

/Winston Folmar/

Staff Attorney

Law Office 101

(571) 272-9716 (Tel.)

winston.folmar@uspto.gov

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.