UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

RESPONSE TIME LIMIT:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

MAILING/E-MAILING DATE INFORMATION:  If the mailing or e-mailing date of this Office action does not appear above, this information can be obtained by visiting the USPTO website at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/, inserting the application serial number, and viewing the prosecution history for the mailing date of the most recently issued Office communication.

 

Serial Number  76/327824

 

The applicant’s amended identification of services is acceptable and has been entered into the record.

 

SECTION 2(D) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL

Registration was previously refused under section 2(d) of the Trademark Act in view of Registration Nos. 2678712 and 2992731.  The refusal to register the applicant’s mark is repeated and made FINAL.

 

The registered marks are both owned by Fiesta Palms, LLC.  The applicant is identified as Canal Group, Inc.  The applicant and registrant are two separate entities and therefor two separate sources for their respective services.  Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration where an applied-for mark so resembles a registered mark that it is likely, when applied to the goods and/or services, to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive the potential consumer as to the source of the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1207.01.  The Court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), listed the principal factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  Among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, and the relatedness of the goods and/or services.  The overriding concern is to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services.  In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the registrant.  In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lone Star Mfg. Co. v. Bill Beasley, Inc., 498 F.2d 906, 182 USPQ 368 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

 

Comparison of the Marks

The examining attorney must look at the marks in their entireties under Section 2(d). Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re National Data Corp., 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976). In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1988).  TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii). 

 

In the registered marks the wording A MALOOF CASINO RESORT simply indicates the type of establishment where the goods and services are offered and indicates the owner or person(s) involved in the establishment.  The wording PALMS is the only non-descriptive portion of the registered marks and arguably is the strongest portion of the mark.

 

The applicant’s mark STUFF AT THE PALMS connotes things that can be purchased at the PALMS casino resort.  The PALMS portion of the applicant’s mark is the strongest portion of the mark.  The dominant portions of the marks are identical.

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).

 

In the case at hand the marks are sufficiently similar and the applicant’s mark conveys a commercial impression of being related to the registrant that consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that the goods and services come from the same source, when in fact they do not.

 

Comparison of the Goods and Services

The applicant and registrant use their marks on retail store services featuring some of the same goods and the registrant uses its mark on some of the goods featured in the applicant’s retail store services.

 

The applicant and registrant provide the same type of service and the applicant’s services are related to the registrant’s goods.

 

Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  See In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (BIGG’S for retail grocery and general merchandise store services held confusingly similar to BIGGS for furniture); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women’s clothing store services and clothing held likely to be confused with CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms); In re United Service Distributors, Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (design for distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids held likely to be confused with design for skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB for various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing held likely to be confused with THE “21” CLUB (stylized) for restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (STEELCARE INC. for refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery held likely to be confused with STEELCASE for office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (use of similar marks for trucking services and on motor trucks and busses is likely to cause confusion).

 

The applicant indicates in its response that “Applicant’s mark “STUFF AT THE PALMS” refers to goods sold at the Palms Casino Resort.  The Palms Resort is the subject of the marks cited by the Examiner.”  The fact that the applicant’s retail services are offered at the same place that the registrant’s services and goods are offered is proof that the goods and services are being offered through the same channel of trade to the same customers. 

 

The examining attorney’s argument is strengthened by the fact that the applicant’s services and the registrant’s goods and services are marketed and offered in the same place and would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give  rise to the mistaken belief that the goods/services come from a common source.  In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).  TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The applicant’s and registrant’s marks are sufficiently similar and the goods and services of the parties are sufficiently the same or related that confusion as to the source of the goods and services is likely.  The refusal to register the applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is made FINAL.

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

 

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matters.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

/Kelley L. Wells/

Kelley L. Wells

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 105

Phone: 571-272-9312

Fax: 571-273-9105

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office action form available on our website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.  If the Office action issued via e-mail, you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office action to respond via TEAS.  NOTE:  Do not respond by e-mail.  THE USPTO WILL NOT ACCEPT AN E-MAILED RESPONSE.
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above, and include the serial number, law office number, and examining attorney’s name.  NOTE:  The filing date of the response will be the date of receipt in the Office, not the postmarked date.  To ensure your response is timely, use a certificate of mailing.  37 C.F.R. §2.197.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.