UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, WE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF OUR MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE. 

 

 

Serial Number  76/110293

 

This letter responds to the applicant’s communication filed on February 28, 2005.  The examining attorney acknowledges and accepts the amendment to the identification of goods.  However, regarding the substantive refusal, the applicant should note the following.

 

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL – FINAL

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2831063 as to be likely, when used on the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

 

 

 

SIMILARITY OF THE GOODS

 

As amended, the applicant uses it mark on diamonds, as compared to the registrant’s goods which are “jewelry.”  The applicant argues that the amendment distances its goods from the goods of the registrant.  The applicant should note, however, that the goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods/services come from a common source.  In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).  TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

Attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods as those of applicant and registrant in this case.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods listed therein, namely diamonds and jewelry, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1218 (TTAB 2001), citing In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); and In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).

 

The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source of those goods.  See In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 831 (TTAB 1984), and cases cited therein; TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Further, neither the application nor the registration contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., jewelry and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. V. KangaROOS U.S.A. Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994).

 

Lastly, likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods as they are identified in the application and the registration. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Paula Payne Products Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Since the identification of the registrant’s goods is very broad, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods of the type described, including those in the applicant’s more specific identification, that they move in all normal channels of trade and that they are available to all potential customers.  In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981); In re Optica International, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

 

 

 

 

SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS

 

As previously stated, the applicant is seeking registration of the mark “PROVENANCE REPORT” and design, as compared to the registrant’s mark which is “PROVENANCE.”  The applicant argues that the mere fact that the marks in issue share elements, even dominant elements, does not compel a conclusion of likely confusion.  The applicant has listed a number of cases which they state clearly support the coexistence of the applicant’s mark with the cited mark.  The examining attorney respectfully disagrees with the applicant’s conclusion.  In each of the cases cited by the applicant, the additional elements alter the meaning of the marks, thereby changing the overall commercial impression of the marks.  That is not the case in this instance.  Rather, the addition of the term "report" to the very distinctive and arbitrary term “PROVENANCE” is likely to be viewed by consumers as a certificate or informational packet accompanying the specific diamonds purchased through the registrant.   In other words, the addition of the word “report” does not obviate the similarity between the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.  Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“BENGAL” and “BENGAL LANCER”); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“THE LILLY” and “LILLI ANN”); In re El Torito Rests. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (“MACHO” and “MACHO COMBOS”); In re United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (“CAREER IMAGE” and “CREST CAREER IMAGES”); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (“CONFIRM” and “CONFIRMCELLS”); In re Riddle, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) (“ACCUTUNE” and “RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE”); In re Cosvetic Laboratories, Inc., 202 USPQ 842 (TTAB 1979) (“HEAD START” and “HEAD START COSVETIC”); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).

 

The applicant has essentially appropriated the entire registered mark.  The addition of a name or another term to a registered mark is generally insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc. 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (CCPA 1975).  By adding the word "report" to the wording "PROVENANCE," applicant has failed to meet its burden of selecting a mark that is not likely to cause confusion with a mark which is already registered.

Next, the applicant argues that the design may dominate or at least be a significant factor in distinguishing the marks.  However, as previously indicated, when a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods or services.  Therefore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight in determining likelihood of confusion.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc., 192 USPQ 729 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  The addition of a design element does not obviate the similarity between the marks.  In re Shell Oil Company, 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §§1207.01(b)(viii) and 1207.01(c)(ii).

 

 

 

 

 

The applicant has appropriated the registered mark in its entirety and added to it a relatively descriptive term and design.   As a result, prospective purchasers of applicant's goods who are familiar with the use of the registered mark in connection with related products would be likely to assume that the design is simply a new way in which registrant's established trademark is being presented.

 

Lastly, the applicant argues that buyers of diamonds are generally sophisticated consumers who exercise greater care when purchasing such goods.  It should be noted, however, that the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  See In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii).

 

In closing, the examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).

 

RESPONSE TO FINAL REFUSAL

 

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final action by: 

 

(1)   submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or

(2)   filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 et seq.; TBMP Chapter 1200).

 

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2).  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matter.  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

 

NOTICE:  FEE CHANGE   

 

Effective January 31, 2005 and pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 108-447, the following are the fees that will be charged for filing a trademark application:

 

(1) $325 per international class if filed electronically using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS); or 

 

(2)   $375 per international class if filed on paper

 

These fees will be charged not only when a new application is filed, but also when payments are made to add classes to an existing application. If such payments are submitted with a TEAS response, the fee will be  $325 per class, and if such payments are made with a paper response, the fee will be $375 per class.

 

The new fee requirements will apply to any fees filed on or after January 31, 2005.

 

NOTICE:  TRADEMARK OPERATION RELOCATION

 

The Trademark Operation has relocated to Alexandria, Virginia.  Effective October 4, 2004, all Trademark-related paper mail (except documents sent to the Assignment Services Division for recordation, certain documents filed under the Madrid Protocol, and requests for copies of trademark documents) must be sent to:

 

Commissioner for Trademarks

P.O. Box 1451

Alexandria, VA  22313-1451

 

Applicants, attorneys and other Trademark customers are strongly encouraged to correspond with the USPTO online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html.

 

 

Midge F. Butler

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 108

(443) 394-3725

fax (571) 273-9108

 

 

HOW TO RESPOND TO THIS OFFICE ACTION:

• ONLINE RESPONSE:  You may respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Response to Office Action form (visit http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html and follow the instructions, but if the Office Action issued via email you must wait 72 hours after receipt of the Office Action to respond via TEAS).
• REGULAR MAIL RESPONSE:  To respond by regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing return address above and include the serial number, law office number and examining attorney’s name in your response.

 

STATUS OF APPLICATION: To check the status of your application, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at http://tarr.uspto.gov.

 

VIEW APPLICATION DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Documents in the electronic file for pending applications can be viewed and downloaded online at http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow.

 

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: For general information about trademarks, please visit the Office’s website at http://www.gov.uspto.report/main/trademarks.htm

 

FOR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OFFICE ACTION, PLEASE CONTACT THE ASSIGNED EXAMINING ATTORNEY SPECIFIED ABOVE.